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Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release
Regulations and Sex Offender Recidivism
J.J. PRESCOTT
The purported purpose of sex offender post-release regulations (e.g.,
community notification and residency restrictions) is the reduction of sex
offender recidivism. On their face, these laws seem well-designed and
likely to be effective. A simple economic framework of offender behavior
can be used to formalize these basic intuitions: in essence, post-release
regulations either increase the probability of detection or increase the
immediate cost of engaging in the prohibited activity (or both), and so
should reduce the likelihood of criminal behavior. These laws aim to
incapacitate people outside of prison. Yet, empirical researchers to date
have found essentially no reliable evidence that these laws work to reduce
sex offender recidivism (despite years and years of effort), and some
evidence (and plenty of expert sentiment) suggests that these laws
may increase sex offender recidivism. In this Article, I develop a more
comprehensive economic model of criminal behavior—or, rather, I present
a simple, but complete model—that clarifies that these laws have at best a
theoretically ambiguous effect on recidivism levels. First, I argue that the
conditions that must hold for these laws to increase the legal and physical
costs of returning to sex crime are difficult to satisfy. There are simply too
many necessary conditions, some of which are at odds with others. Second,
I contend that even when these conditions hold, our intuitions mislead us in
this domain by ignoring a critical aspect of criminal deterrence: to be
deterred, potential offenders must have something to lose. I conclude that
post-release laws are much more likely to succeed if they are combined
with robust reintegration efforts to give previously convicted sex offenders
a stake in society, and therefore, in eschewing future criminal activity.
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Portmanteau Ascendant: Post-Release
Regulations and Sex Offender Recidivism
J.J. PRESCOTT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The primary aim of sex offender post-release regulations (e.g.,
community notification and residency restrictions) is the incapacitation of
potential recidivists following their release from prison. Over the last thirty
years,1 this relatively young area of law has been in near constant motion.
Its proponents have often been innovative, and the laws themselves have
been subject to controversy in the courts and in the press from the outset.2
Nevertheless, the scope and importance of sex offender post-release
(SOPR) laws today were in many ways simply inevitable. Incarceration is
very effective at reducing recidivism risk, but keeping people behind bars
indefinitely is also very costly. With modern information and monitoring
technology transforming our lives almost daily, it was only a matter of
time before policymakers recognized that incapacitating people outside of
prison might be the best of all worlds: relatively small price tag, but
potentially very effective control and therefore minimal recidivism.3
*
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Jim Hines, Wayne
Logan, Murat Mungan, and Danny Schaffa for comments, and to Andrea Amulic, Spencer Klein, and
Julie Siegel for excellent research assistance.
1
Many features of these laws are still novel as many as thirty years later. Even so, in many ways,
the sex offender laws that federal, state, and local policymakers have developed and implemented in
recent decades are just the latest incarnation (along with many cousins and second cousins) of age-old
felon registration laws. See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control over Potential
Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV 60, 62 n.14 (1954) (discussing the emergence of criminal registration
statutes in the 1930s); see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-181 (2015) (requiring that persons who have
been convicted of a felony more than twice register within twenty-four hours of arrival); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.13(2)–(3) (West 2015) (requiring that persons who have been convicted of a felony in
Florida, or any crime in any federal or other state court, register within forty-eight hours of arrival).
2
See, e.g., California: Housing Restrictions Overturned for Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/us/california-housing-restrictions-overturned-for-sex-offen
ders.html?_r=1; L.L. Brasier, Does Michigan’s Sex Offender Registry Keep Us Safer?, DETROIT FREE
PRESS (May 18, 2015), http://www.freep.com/wlna/news/local/michigan/2015/05/16/sex-offenderregistries-fire-michigan/27453025/ [https://perma.cc/8NVL-Q5DN]; L.L. Brasier, Judge: Parts of
State’s Sex Offender Law Unconstitutional, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2015/04/06/michigan-sex-offender-registry-judge-rob
ert-cleland-state-police-governor-snyder/25385625/ [https://perma.cc/8M9Z-8HSJ].
3
See Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 173–74
(2000) (describing the American public’s struggle between the desire to control the number of criminal
offenders and the financial costs of doing so). Admittedly, these developments were also motivated by
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Efforts to reduce sex crime through the enactment and enforcement of
these laws continue apace. Today’s strategies include information
dissemination (registration and community notification laws),4 geographic
isolation (residency restrictions),5 routine restraints and disabilities
(employment, travel, and activity restrictions),6 and intensive real-time
observation (GPS monitoring).7 In a limited sense, these developments are
encouraging.8 Abstracting from the current arrangement of our world, one
would predict that a well-functioning criminal justice system would
employ a wide range of punishments, treatments, and other tools to modify
behavior—even for serious crimes.9 Some of these would surely include
the tools currently deployed against released sex offenders, and in fact
parole and probation officers do make use of these devices when non-sex
offenders are released, albeit in a more individually tailored way.10
constitutional ex post facto restrictions. As the public began to panic over sex offenders in the late
1980s and 1990s, imposing longer sentences on already incarcerated offenders was off the table. See
Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990) (stating that legislatures cannot retroactively increase
the length of punishment for criminal acts). Consequently, for any of a number of potential reasons,
policymakers had to devise a means for incarcerating sex offenders while still releasing them at the end
of their prison sentences. Whether the motivation was discharging anger or disgust by making sex
offenders leap through endless shame-inducing hoops (punishment) or simply reducing the threat they
pose going forward (regulation), the result was the same: isolation and disability. See Jill S. Levenson
et al., Public Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES SOC.
ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 137, 139–40 (2007) (reporting community members’ reactions to sex offender
notification and the perceived consequences of such notification).
4
Levenson et al., supra note 3, at 138–39 (summarizing various SOPR laws that require states to
maintain registries of sex offenders’ addresses, permit law enforcement personnel to disclose such
information to community residents, and establish online databases of sex offender registry
information).
5
Brian J. Love, Regulating for Safety or Punishing Depravity? A Pathfinder for Sex Offender
Residency Restriction Statutes, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 834, 836 (2007) (“[R]esidency restrictions represent
the next wave in a continuing effort by state legislatures to respond to public concerns regarding the
presence of convicted sex offenders in their constituent communities.”).
6
Bret R. Hobson, Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep Convicted Sex Offenders
Away from Children?, 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 963–64 (2006) (noting that some states have enacted laws
that ban sex offenders from working or traveling in certain areas).
7
Peter M. Thomson, A Comprehensive Strategy Targeting Recidivist Criminals with Continuous
Real-Time GPS Monitoring: Is Reverse Engineering Crime Control Possible?, ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at
23, 24 (describing the functionality of tracking individuals with GPS technology).
8
The idea that we ought to punish and/or rehabilitate all felons (or almost all felons) by locking
them up in buildings for long periods of time is outmoded. At the time it became important,
incarceration in penitentiaries was a humane alternative to death or torture and shame, but it seems hard
to believe that virtually all serious criminals are best punished by imprisonment, with the only question
being how long they ought to remain behind bars.
9
Imprisonment as punishment assumes that incarceration denies people, on average, what they
want most in the world (presumably physical freedom and interaction with their loved ones). We might
be better off trying to ascertain the most cost-effective form of disability or restraint, something
presumably more targeted, that produces fewer third-party effects (family losses) and diffuse social
costs (community dysfunction).
10
E.g., David Iversen, On Parole but Free to Go Anywhere, NEWS8 (May 9, 2014),
http://wtnh.com/2014/05/09/parole-free-go-anywhere [https://perma.cc/MUV2-KFSQ] (linking to a
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On paper, SOPR regulations seem clever, carefully crafted, and thus
very likely to reduce recidivism. As the story goes, each works by making
the commission of another sex offense more difficult, and it does this in a
very specific way, targeting one or more particular criminogenic
mechanisms.11 These tools are likely to be complementary in the sense
that, although some may not alter the behavior of a particular sex offender,
at least one of them will, and for most offenders, the combined power of
the tools may outdo the effectiveness of any one of them alone—perhaps to
the point of approximating the efficacy of incarceration.12 Moreover, the
story continues, even if these laws fail at making crime commission more
difficult, compliance costs for reformed sex offenders will be tolerable,13
and it seems very unlikely that the laws could do any real harm.
Yet the picture on the ground is very different. For decades, advocates
and commentators alike have lamented what they claim are constitutional
violations visited daily upon a population that has already paid for its
crimes.14 Others have decried the affront to human dignity implicit in the
enforcement of these laws.15 None of these reactions is surprising.16 What
document for the acknowledgement of release conditions of a parolee from the Connecticut Board of
Pardons and Paroles).
11
Jill S. Levenson & David A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence:
The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 172–74 (2007) (explaining that
registration policies were designed to assist law enforcement personnel with tracking and apprehending
potential suspects, notification policies were enacted to inform communities, residency restrictions seek
to keep sex offenders away from children, and GPS monitoring allows sex offenders to remain in their
communities while being under constant surveillance).
12
Cf. Daniel Simundza, Criminal Registries, Community Notification, and Optimal Avoidance, 39
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73, 81 (2014) (finding that notification policies are complementary to criminal
penalties).
13
For example, satisfying public concern for child safety alone can serve as a justification for
imposing even burdensome obligations on sex offenders. See, e.g., Mother Fighting to Change Sex
Offender Registry Laws, WARWICK BEACON (Apr. 28, 2015), http://warwickonline.com/stories/motherfighting-to-change-sex-offender-residency-laws,101981 [https://perma.cc/WNJ5-MUB8] (quoting a
community resident in saying: “I know he still has his rights, but shouldn’t the rights of our children
and their safety come first? He’s a convicted felon.”).
14
See, for example, Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92–106 (2003), for the Supreme Court’s seminal
ruling on whether sex offender registration and notification statutes violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. For other Supreme Court cases involving constitutional claims against
registration and notification laws, see United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2502–05 (2013);
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3–8 (2003); and Carr v. United States,
560 U.S. 438, 458 (2010).
15
See, e.g., Astrid Birgden & Heather Cucolo, The Treatment of Sex Offenders: Evidence, Ethics,
and Human Rights, 23 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 295, 307–08 (2011) (arguing in favor of
the treatment of sex offenders with respect and dignity).
16
Individuals convicted of crimes in the 1970s certainly did not anticipate the arrival of SOPR
regulations, and these laws as a practical matter do involve shaming, whether this result is intentional
or not. Compare Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV.
349, 384–85 (1997) (asserting that shaming penalties are worthwhile sanctions because they are lowcost and are effective in conveying condemnation), with Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54
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is surprising is that, in the face of all of this criticism, virtually no reliable
empirical evidence exists to support claims that SOPR laws are effective at
reducing sex offender recidivism, notwithstanding decades of scholarly
effort. Admittedly, it is very difficult to establish statistically that a legal or
policy innovation has “no effect” on a particular outcome.17 Even so, a
scholarly consensus has emerged—something very rare indeed—that these
laws fail on their own terms,18 despite decades of research in which the
initial goal for some researchers must have been to quantify the extent of
the benefits of these laws.19 Instead, many have now adopted the view that
these laws may in fact increase recidivism by exacerbating the risk factors
of individuals subject to these laws.20
VAND. L. REV. 2157, 2219 (2001) (denying the retributive value of shaming punishments and arguing,
“[b]ecause shaming punishments have as their goal the destruction of a person’s reputation and dignity,
the shaming punishment denies the very dignity of moral agency that the retributive encounter is
designed to uphold”).
17
See Priya Ranganathan et al., Common Pitfalls in Statistical Analysis: “No Evidence of Effect”
Versus “Evidence of No Effect”, 6 PERSP. CLINICAL RES. 62, 62 (2015) (explaining the difference
between evidence of “no effect” and “no evidence” of an effect); William Odita Tarnow-Mordi &
Michael J.R. Healy, Distinguishing Between “No Evidence of Effect” and “Evidence of No Effect” in
Randomised Controlled Trials and Other Comparisons, 80 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 210, 210
(1999) (noting that if a randomized controlled trial fails to show a difference in outcomes, it does not
necessarily imply that the treatment failed; the trial may have been unable to detect the effect).
18
See, e.g., Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or
Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 418 (2010) (“Although additional community-based studies
are needed, research to date indicates that after 15 years the laws have had little impact on recidivism
rates and the incidence of sexually based crimes.”); Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity
Matter? A Geographic Analysis of Sex Offense Recidivism, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 484, 500 (2008)
(“[T]he results presented here provide very little support for the notion that residency restriction laws
would lower the incidence of sexual recidivism . . . .”); Matt R. Nobles et al., Effectiveness of
Residence Restrictions in Preventing Sex Offense Recidivism, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 491, 494 (2012)
(“There is no established correlation between proximity to schools or child care facilities and sex
offense recidivism.”); Richard Tewksbury et al., A Longitudinal Examination of Sex Offender
Recidivism Prior to and Following Implementation of SORN, 30 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 308, 324 (2012)
(finding that sex offender registration and notification “as a policy has little effect on two related and
socially important recidivism outcomes using the trajectory methodology: (1) reducing/deterring sexual
recidivism; and (2) reducing/deterring recidivism in general”).
19
But see David M. Bierie, The Utility of Sex Offender Registration: A Research Note, J. SEXUAL
AGGRESSION 2, 4–6 (2015) (contending that this consensus view is without foundation, discussing
some of my own work to make this case, and arguing that these laws do matter (citing J.J. Prescott &
Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54
J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011))).
20
See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Jeglic et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Depression and
Hopelessness Among Sex Offenders Subject to Community Notification and Residence Restriction
Legislation, 37 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 46, 55 (2012) (finding that sex offender laws increase feelings of
hopelessness and depression among sex offenders, and consequently, “that community protection
legislation may in fact be destabilizing to sex offenders, thus operating counter to the intended goal of
decreasing sex offender recidivism”); Jill S. Levenson, An Evidence-Based Perspective on Sexual
Offender Registration and Residential Restrictions, in SEXUAL OFFENDING 861, 865–66 (Amy Phenix
& Harry M. Hoberman eds., 2016) (“When prisoners are released from incarceration, they commonly
seek housing with relatives, but strict residence laws can eliminate such options for sex offenders.
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At least one reason why SOPR laws remain on the books—and indeed
continue to expand21—despite the absence of any social science or other
evidence that they work is no mystery: politics.22 Sex offenders may be the
very definition of a “discrete and insular minority.”23 The number of sex
offenders who are subject to these laws continues to grow; so does the
number of friends and family members of offenders, who are also
negatively affected by these laws. But sex offenders “typically arouse
contemptuous anger and disgust.”24 By and large the public has little
sympathy for convicted sex offenders.25 Scholars have offered a number of
Unable to reside with family and without the ﬁnancial resources to pay security deposits and rent
payments, some sex offenders face homelessness. Ironically, housing instability is consistently
associated with criminal recidivism and absconding.”); Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 19, at 192 (“We
estimate that . . . the[] benefits [of notification laws] dissipate as more offenders become subject to
notification requirements. This pattern is consistent with notification deterring nonregistered
individuals but encouraging recidivism among registered offenders, perhaps because of the social and
financial costs associated with the public release of their criminal history and personal information.
When a registry is of average size, adding a notification regime effectively increases the number of sex
offenses by more than 1.57 percent.”); Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral
Consequences of Sex Offender Registry Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 540 (2007)
(discussing the impact of such laws on recidivism). Tewksbury contends:
It seems likely that RSOs [registered sex offenders] will continue to experience
persistent stress from difficulties in meeting one of their most basic needs: decent,
safe, and affordable housing. As a result, RSOs may feel they have little choice but
to abscond from supervision and fail to register. Even worse, they may seek ways to
relieve their increasing levels of stress and frustration, which are among the most
powerful factors contributing to sex offense recidivism.
Tewksbury, supra, at 540.
21
See, e.g., ACLU of Virginia Denounces Governor’s Signing of New Sex Offender Registry Bills,
AUGUSTA FREE PRESS (Mar. 27, 2015), http://augustafreepress.com/aclu-of-virginia-denouncesgovernors-signing-of-new-sex-offender-registry-bills/
[https://perma.cc/3T6R-H2VM];
Elizabeth
Hewitt, Governor Signs Sex Offender Bill into Law, VT DIGGER (Feb. 25, 2015), http://vtdigger.org/
2015/02/25/governor-signs-sex-offender-bill-law/ [https://perma.cc/N77W-5ZNM].
22
There are various versions of this story. See, e.g., Bela August Walker, Essay: Deciphering
Risk: Sex Offender Statutes and Moral Panic in a Risk Society, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 198 (2010)
(“Politically, to oppose such statutes would be seen as backing sexual abuse and would mean certain
death in the polls.”); Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 436 (2010) (describing a “sea change” elevating sex offender policies from
“political posturing” to a “criminal war on sex offenders”).
23
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
24
TERENCE W. CAMPBELL, ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS: PROBLEMS AND PITFALLS 3 (2d ed.
2007).
25
Individual sex offenders with the right “story” sometimes receive positive attention from a
broader slice of the population and the mainstream media. E.g., Julie Bosman, Teenager’s Jailing
Brings a Call to Fix Sex Offender Registries, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com
/2015/07/05/us/teenagers-jailing-brings-a-call-to-fix-sex-offender-registries.html (recounting the many
post-release circumstances faced by a nineteen-year-old young man who had sexual intercourse with a
fourteen-year-old young woman and the national attention it drew to the possibility of sex offender
registry reform); Tim Vandenack, Michigan Judge Grants Zach Anderson Leniency, Keeps Him Off
Michigan Sex Offender Registry, ELKHART TRUTH (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.elkharttruth.
com/news/crime-fire-courts/2015/10/19/Elkhart-s-Zach-Anderson-removed-from-Michigan-sex-
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other theories of “stasis” as well. Yet the strength of the underlying logic
of these laws must play a role. Put simply, SOPR laws sound like good
ideas, and good ideas can be so persuasive on their own terms that actual
evidence supporting them is unnecessary.27
For example, community notification (often referred to as Megan’s
Law) involves making the names and other identifying information of
convicted sex offenders publicly available.28 The justification for making
this information public is two-fold. First, members of the public who worry
they might become victims can use the information to engage in more
effective precautionary behavior.29 The classic example in this context is
Megan Kanka herself, who was attacked by a neighbor who had been
previously convicted of a sex offense; Megan’s parents did not know about
his criminal history.30 Second, community notification serves to deputize
the public.31 With everyone (or at least some number of individuals) in the
26

offender-registry-granted-Holmes-Youthful-Training-Act-status.html [https://perma.cc/4XT6-G27K]
(describing how the offender received a new sentencing hearing at which the judge ruled he was not
required to register as a sex offender in Michigan, where the offense took place, but would still have to
register in Indiana, where he resided at the time).
26
See generally Wayne A. Logan, Megan’s Laws as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61
SYRACUSE L. REV. 371, 387–99 (2011) (describing factors contributing to the prolonged political
success of registration and notification requirements, which include public panic, political
maneuvering, risk aversion, information entitlement, and the involvement of the federal government
(citing WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY
NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 85–108 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2009))).
27
Sarah K. Brem & Lance J. Rips, Explanation and Evidence in Informal Argument, 24
COGNITIVE SCI. 573, 595–96 (2000) (“[A]rguers may construct an explanation and then find that
explanation so compelling that they terminate the process of search[ing] for and testing
hypotheses . . . .”); Tania Lombrozo, The Structure and Function of Explanations, 10 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 464, 468 (2006) (“In evaluating claims, the existence of explanations can constitute
evidence, and serve as a basis for eliminating possibilities to assess probability.”).
28
See, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric,
76 IND. L.J. 315, 316 n.7 (2001) (describing how registration laws require convicted offenders to
furnish information such as their address to authorities, how “Megan’s Law” mandates that this
information then be disseminated to the public, and how “every state has now adopted some version of
Megan’s Law”).
29
Anthony J. Petrosino & Carolyn Petrosino, The Public Safety Potential of Megan’s Law in
Massachusetts: An Assessment from a Sample of Criminal Sexual Psychopaths, 45 CRIME & DELINQ.
140, 141 (1999) (“If endangered citizens know that a released sex offender is among them, it is
assumed that they can take steps to prevent the victimization of themselves and other more vulnerable
persons . . . .”).
30
Renee Marie Shelby & Anthony Ryan Hatch, Obscuring Sexual Crime: Examining Media
Representations of Sexual Violence in Megan’s Law, 27 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 402, 402 (2014) (reporting
that Megan’s parents asserted after her death that it is a parent’s right to know the locations of sexual
predators and that Megan’s death would not have occurred had they been aware of their neighbor’s
previous sex offense convictions).
31
Amy L. Anderson & Lisa L. Sample, Public Awareness and Action Resulting from Sex
Offender Community Notification Laws, 19 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 371, 372 (2008) (explaining that
the goals of notification laws include informing citizens about former sex offenders’ whereabouts so
they can take protective action and augment public safety provided by other legislation and
enforcement activities); see also Simundza, supra note 12, at 81 (“Informing the community of
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neighborhood keeping their eyes on nearby registered sex offenders, any
crime one of these potential recidivists commits is much more likely to be
detected, making it less likely that he will attempt the crime in the first
place, and more likely that he will be apprehended if he does.
Likewise, residency restrictions seem like no-brainers. If even a few
sex offenders may be “impulse” offenders,32 why not require every one of
them to live some distance away from places where they are more likely to
interact with potential victims?33 Other restrictions rely on the same logic.
If there is even a small chance, for instance, that allowing a registered sex
offender to operate an ice cream truck,34 dress up for Halloween,35 or
participate in church events36 might lead to a sex crime, isn’t it better to be
safe than sorry? Each of these specific limitations seems fairly minor
(except perhaps the church ordinance), and the salience and seriousness of
criminals’ identities deters crime by increasing detection rates and making attacking more costly for
registered criminals.”).
32
See JILL D. STINSON ET AL., SEX OFFENDING: CAUSAL THEORIES TO INFORM RESEARCH,
PREVENTION, AND TREATMENT 187–88 (2008) (describing how impulsivity is a factor that compounds
an individual’s “self-regulatory difficulties to create a willingness to engage in sexually inappropriate
[behavior]”); Judith V. Becker, Offenders: Characteristics and Treatment, 4 FUTURE CHILD. 176, 182
(1994) (enumerating factors, including poor impulse control, that are theorized to be necessary for
pedophilic action).
33
Cf. Melanie Clark Mogavero & Leslie W. Kennedy, The Social and Geographical Patterns of
Sexual Offending: Is Sex Offender Residence Restriction Legislation Practical?, VICTIMS &
OFFENDERS 2 (Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15564886.2015.1084962
[https://perma.cc/Z86L-BLKQ] (noting that, to date, thirty states have enacted residency restrictions of
varying severity—ranging from 500 feet to 2,500 feet from particular landmarks—in the hope of
preventing sex offenders from residing in close proximity to children and explaining that the creation of
sex-offender-free zones provides communities with a sense of security).
34
For example, in Massachusetts, New York, and Tennessee, registrants cannot operate ice cream
trucks. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 48 (West 2015); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-v (McKinney
2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-215(a)(3) (West 2015).
35
In Tennessee, certain sex offender registrants may not “[p]retend to be, dress as, impersonate or
otherwise assume the identity of a real or fictional person or character or a member of a profession,
vocation or occupation while in the presence of a minor.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-215(a)(1).
36
In Georgia, registrants cannot work or volunteer at a church. GA. CODE. ANN. § 42-1-15(c)(1)
(West 2015). In Oklahoma, registrants must receive written permission from the “religious leader” of a
church or other institution before entering to worship. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1125(E) (West
2015). Under a law on the books in North Carolina, certain registrants may not be present in any place
where minors gather for “regularly scheduled educational, recreational, or social programs.” N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-208.18(a)(3) (West 2015). That includes churches and other institutions of religious
worship. See Bonnie Rochman, Should Sex Offenders Be Barred from Church?, TIME (Oct. 14, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929736,00.html [http://web.archive.org/web/20150
912062113/http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929736,00.html] (discussing the North
Carolina law and its consequence of excluding sex offenders from religious worship). The North
Carolina law was recently declared unconstitutional by the Middle District. Does v. Cooper, No. 1:13cv-711, 2015 WL 8179498, at *10 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 7, 2015) (“[S]ubsection (a)(3) is indeed
unconstitutionally vague because it does not ‘define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
[such] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
357 (1983))).
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even a single criminal incident is significant. If one also happens to
discount the costs imposed by these laws on registered sex offenders and
their friends and family members and instead considers only the role these
regulations may play in enhancing public safety, SOPR laws just seem like
common sense.
In this Article, I address the impasse that appears to exist in this
debate. On one side, many scholars see no upside to these laws, many
downsides, and perhaps even more crime as a consequence of enacting
them. On the other side, many policymakers and members of the public
have trouble comprehending how these laws could fail to work, at least at
the margin, and find the idea that these laws might actually make
recidivism rates worse to be utterly unintelligible. In what follows, I
present a simple economic framework—an economic model of crime—to
formalize the intuitions of both sides. The model does just what a good
model ought to do: crystallize thinking and identify issues that fly under
the radar. The takeaway from this analysis is that these laws have, at best, a
theoretically ambiguous effect on recidivism levels.
A big part of the confusion derives from a typically neglected
parameter of the standard economic model of crime. This parameter—
Becker’s “portmanteau variable”37—is often uninteresting and remains in
the shadows because punishment is usually in the form of incarceration or
a fine to be imposed after someone is convicted, and because policy
changes are usually evaluated in isolation.38 In the sex offender postrelease context, however, this parameter becomes critical, because SOPR
laws affect many aspects of a registered offender’s life other than just the
prospect of prison for committing a crime. These indirect effects may
swamp the direct effects,39 leading to unexpected consequences.40 For
37

Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 177
(1968) (characterizing the portmanteau variable as part of an equation for determining whether an
individual will engage in crime, and defining the variable as representing “other influences” such as
“the income available to him in legal and other illegal activities, the frequency of nuisance arrests, and
his willingness to commit an illegal act”).
38
See id. at 177 n.15 (noting that “among other things,” the portmanteau variable “depends on the
p’s and f’’s meted out for other competing offenses,” which many analyses assume will remain
constant).
39
See, e.g., Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Consequences of Sex Offender Registration, 21 J.
CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 67, 79 (2005) (“[I]t is clear that the collateral consequences of sex offender
registration as a criminal sanction may be quite serious and harmful, for individual offenders, for their
families and loved ones, and for communities in general.”).
40
See Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 19, at 164 (“[N]otification laws were designed to reduce
recidivism . . . but notification may also reduce crime by enhancing the punishment for first-time or
nonregistered sex offenders. . . .”); cf. J.J. Prescott, Child Pornography and Community Notification:
How an Attempt to Reduce Crime Can Achieve the Opposite, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 93, 98 (2011) (“As
technology evolves to allow better law enforcement monitoring of the Internet, potential offenders will
presumably find it increasingly difficult to establish, expand, or locate child pornography networks
without some means of identifying individuals with similar inclinations or experiences. Web registry
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41

those who study re-entry issues, none of this will be surprising. The same
dynamics lead to recommendations to provide jobs and stable housing to
the recently released in hopes of giving them a stake in society.42
Unfortunately, the indirect effects of SOPR laws do exactly the opposite,
and so the question becomes: are the direct effects of these laws so great so
as to make up the difference?43
II. FRAMEWORK
Here I introduce a simple economic model of crime. These are
standard ideas; they have been around for decades, some even longer.44
With the arrival of post-incarceration incapacitation, however, certain
typically neglected features of the model step into the spotlight. Using this
framework, it is easier to understand how SOPR laws are likely to affect
offender behavior, sometimes in offsetting ways.
The notions behind economic models of crime are simple: potential
offenders prefer pleasure to pain (however defined) and are at least
minimally rational in how they behave.45 The minimal rationality condition
is satisfied when potential offenders 1) can observe at least some of their
environment (including laws and legal changes), 2) can react at least some
of the time to changes in their environment by altering their behavior, and
3) are at least somewhat forward looking such that future consequences
(including punishments imposed in the future) are considered part of the
data may provide the key, because offender listings ‘expressly indicate, or can be used to help establish,
an individual’s proclivities—including sexual interest in children.’”).
41
See JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES FOR PRISON
REENTRY xxiv, 143–47, 172–76, 238–39 (2005) (discussing aspects of these connections).
42
Cf. George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not Guilty”: The Collateral
Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 1746, 1787 (2012) (explaining that, according to moral hazard theory, the “best behavior comes
from people with a stake in society”).
43
A natural question is whether there might be a way to tweak SOPR laws so as to achieve the
direct effects of these laws without also generating the counterproductive indirect effects. The bottomline answer to this question is “no”; these laws work by disclosing information to the public and by
limiting the movement and choices of offenders, regardless of whether they are at risk of re-offending.
Low-burden registration requirements and free, reliable, real-time GPS monitoring devices that cannot
be detected by the public may be realistic “tweaks” that have a much better chance of succeeding, but
only if they are imposed without other SOPR laws. All of that said, it must be the case that, at the
margin, efforts taken to better target these laws—or to limit their burdens, even somewhat—will make
these laws more effective.
44
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 37, at 177. For related textbook treatments, see A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 91–101 (2003); PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D.
WITTE, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE: THEORY, METHODS, AND APPLICATIONS
151–57 (1984); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 492–530 (2004).
45
See, e.g., Rafael di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Do Police Reduce Crime? Estimates Using
the Allocation of Police Forces After a Terrorist Attack, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 115, 115 (2004)
(“Classical criminology assumes that criminals are rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of
their actions.”).
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landscape. Importantly, rationality need not be perfect for an economic
approach to be useful at modeling and understanding behavior.47 Potential
offenders can be impulsive, hyperbolic discounters, and suffer from many
types of cognitive and behavioral biases.48 Still, even an extremely
irrational criminal will only rarely, for example, commit a crime in front of
a police officer when there is a dark alley nearby.
Gary Becker’s early model of criminal behavior framed the decision of
whether to commit a crime as a function of three parameters: pj, fj, and uj.49
The parameter pj represents the probability of punishment.50 The parameter
fj captures the severity of the punishment, but is typically (and
significantly) measured as the size of the fine or the number of years of
incarceration.51 The parameter uj captures “other variables, such as the
income available to him in legal and other illegal activities, the frequency
of nuisance arrests, and his willingness to commit an illegal act.”52 In a
footnote, Becker further comments that “[a]mong other things, uj depends
on the p’s and f’s meted out for other competing offenses.”53
At least in principle, the probability of detection (pj) and the severity of
punishment (fj) have relatively predictable consequences for the likelihood
46

Cf. Ronet Bachman et al., The Rationality of Sexual Offending: Testing a Deterrence/Rational
Choice Conception of Sexual Assault, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 343, 346 (1992) (summarizing rational
choice theorists’ views that potential offenders are influenced by the perceived costs and benefits of
their actions, including “the likelihood of social censure”).
47
See Wim Bernasco & Richard Block, Where Offenders Choose to Attack: A Discrete Choice
Model of Robberies in Chicago, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 93, 95–96 (2009) (presenting a model of robbery
locations as one of criminal choice, in which some actors behave rationally, while others stumble into
opportunities to act); see also Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 272–73 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon Smith
eds., 2005) (noting that bounded rationality takes into account that “judgment errors and departures
from expected utility theory” can affect offenders’ cost-benefit comparisons and therefore behavior);
Michael E. O’Neill, The Biology of Irrationality: Crime and the Contingency of Deterrence, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at 287, 295–98 (providing an overview of
bounded rationality models).
48
See David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket’s
Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 306–07 (2002) (discussing criminals’ occasionally impulsive
behavior and noting that some individuals inaccurately perceive the marginal costs of their behavior);
Jolls, supra note 47, at 270–72 (explaining bounded rationality and contending that human cognitive
abilities are often fraught with judgment errors and departures from sound decision making).
49
See Becker, supra note 37, at 177 (describing these as determinants of the number of crimes an
offender will commit, although the characterization works just as well for whether the offender will
choose to commit crime j or not: Oj = Oj (pj, fj, uj)); see also Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal
Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, J. ECON. LIT. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b2e9/7824cfc61b9c908f016d1223cc1ab8c3f706.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G25X-BX23] (recounting the basics of Becker’s model in different terms).
50
The probability of punishment is the product of other probabilities: the probability of detection,
the probability of apprehension, the probability of being charged, the probability of being convicted,
and so on.
51
Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 49 (manuscript at 4).
52
Becker, supra note 37, at 177.
53
Id. at 177 n.15.
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that a potential offender will commit a crime. As Becker summarizes, “[a]n
increase in either pj or fj would reduce the utility expected from an offense
and thus would tend to reduce the number of offenses because either the
probability of ‘paying’ the higher ‘price’ or the ‘price’ itself would
increase.”54 This standard analysis is straightforward so long as we assume
that an offender must commit the crime for either of these two parameters
to affect his utility level and therefore to make a difference in his behavior.
The argument runs as follows: if an offender currently prefers lawful
behavior, it does not matter to the offender’s behavior whether detection
probabilities (pj) or punishment levels (fj) increase, because he will not be
touched by either of these policy changes.55
Unfortunately, as Becker hints, this is not entirely true in the real
world. Because the portmanteau parameter captures “the frequency of
nuisance arrests,”56 which probably also ought to include the likelihood of
a false conviction, changes in both pj and fj may have indirect effects that
could either increase or decrease the likelihood of reoffending. For
instance, one might surmise that suffering through many false arrests might
“harden” a reformed offender. An arrest, even a false one or one for a
minor offense, might make the prospect of returning to prison less
frightening, which could induce an offender who would otherwise have
remained on the straight and narrow to revert to crime.57 A false arrest
might also result in a lost job, a broken relationship, or other difficulties, 58
increasing the likelihood of a former offender returning to crime.59
There are also scenarios in which an increase in average detection
probabilities might generate a greater willingness to commit crime even
among individuals who, at the time they decide to commit a crime, have
not yet been “falsely” arrested. For example, imagine a shift in law
enforcement strategy that brings extreme detection inaccuracy with more
54

Id. at 177.
To further elaborate, the intuition is that if the offender’s privately optimal choice at time zero
is to forgo committing another crime, then an increase in the likelihood of detection or the level of
punishment at time one cannot possibly affect that choice. Indeed, the superiority of the initial choice
becomes even more obvious, barring something strange, like a preference for committing a crime when
detection is high (e.g., the offender does not want to commit the crime unless he is caught) or a desire
to experience only a particularly severe punishment.
56
Becker, supra note 37, at 177.
57
There is some evidence that “scared straight” programs may have this unintended effect. See
Daniel P. Mears, Towards Rational and Evidence-Based Crime Policy, 35 J. CRIM. JUST. 667, 671
(2007) (describing “scared straight” programs, including prison visitation and boot camps).
58
Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 852–54 (2015). “Arrests alone—
regardless of whether they result in conviction—can lead to a range of consequences, including . . .
eviction, license suspension, custody disruption, or adverse employment actions.” Id. at 809.
59
See Zieva Dauber Konvisser, Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction in Women
and the Possibility of Positive Change, 5 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 221, 250–52 (2012) (analyzing the
observed traumatic effects of a false arrest, including “enduring personality change” and
disillusionment with the justice system).
55
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60

intense investigation. The mere prospect of being arrested, convicted, and
punished in spite of your lawful behavior can reduce deterrence for the
simple reason that you have less ability to affect the final outcome with
your behavior.61 On the other side of the ledger, and for the obverse reason,
lower average conviction or clearance rates may not reduce deterrence if
better detection accuracy more than compensates for this decline in
conviction or clearance rates.62
In practice, however, these idiosyncratic possibilities are very unlikely
to occur in the context of traditional reforms to criminal justice policy.63
The influence of the portmanteau variable—or more usefully, the set of
indirect effects that traditional policy levers have on criminal behavior—in
typical settings is small. Nuisance arrests and wrongful convictions, while
extremely serious, are not so systemic or pervasive as to reverse the crimereducing effects of an increase in the likelihood of crime detection (pj).64
Furthermore, increasing the severity of punishment a criminal is to suffer
upon conviction (fj) seemingly cannot push an otherwise reformed former
offender to commit a crime unless this change in severity affects the
likelihood that accused offenders are convicted. Nullification on the basis
of excessive sentences happens,65 but probably not to the extent necessary
60

See Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 279, 280 (1986) (“We conclude that overcompliance is likely to be common, even when
all parties are risk-neutral, in a variety of situations where the uncertainty is relatively small. Very
broad uncertainty, on the other hand, is more likely to lead to undercompliance.”).
61
See Nuno Garoupa & Matteo Rizzolli, Wrongful Convictions Do Lower Deterrence, 168 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 224, 224–25 (2012) (noting that wrongful convictions reduce
the expected benefits of law-abiding behavior). Imagine an enforcement regime in which a crime was
rarely if ever punished (but in which even small probabilities of punishment were sufficient to deter
large numbers of potential offenders) transitioning to a dragnet approach that implicated large numbers
of innocents. In the extreme, if wrongful convictions and acquittals increase to the point where
conviction is random, crime will increase even if the likelihood of punishment goes from 1% to 5%.
But see Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 327, 328–29
(2006) (suggesting that wrongful convictions will minimally affect deterrence).
62
Of course indirect effects can work in the same direction as direct effects. Consider
sophisticated criminals who face no real chance of detection (and so are not directly affected by
increases in pj and fj), but the fact that safer neighborhoods result from increases in pj and fj might
indirectly persuade these offenders to trade in their criminal enterprises for some more legitimate way
to spend their time. This example highlights the importance of lawful alternative opportunities in a
complete model of criminal behavior. At least for those who engage in crime for financial reasons,
alternative means of earning money are always in the mix. See Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 49
(manuscript at 5–6).
63
See Lando, supra note 61, at 333 (“However, the main point to be stressed here is that the
effect, whether positive or negative, is likely to be of little quantitative importance. Under most normal
circumstances, an innocent person’s risk of being wrongfully convicted will be small.”).
64
Id. at 328–29 (discounting the significance of any indirect effects of wrongful convictions
because “the probability of any individual being wrongfully convicted is low since the number of
wrongful convictions is relatively small and many people share the risk”).
65
See James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the
Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 385, 385–86 (1991) (“Jurors are very sensitive to the
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to offset the upsides of heightened punitive sanctions, even if evidence
suggests that any deterrence gains from increasing sanctions (at least from
their present levels) is very small.66
III. SOPR LAWS
In this part of the Article, I analyze possible consequences of SOPR
laws for sex offender recidivism when viewed through the prism of
Becker’s simple economic model of crime. I do not systematically evaluate
the potential consequences of every type of SOPR law; instead, I examine
several archetypes (specifically, registration, notification, residency
restrictions, and GPS monitoring), an exercise that is sufficient to illustrate
the basic mechanics of how these laws are designed to work. Also, I add
another parameter—ci—to the standard framework. This parameter
represents the physical costs of committing a crime, including travel costs,
victim targeting costs, etc. SOPR laws specifically seek to influence this
parameter (most criminal laws do not, except indirectly through pj and fj),
so it makes sense to pull it out of the portmanteau.67
According to traditional theory, and all else being equal, a registered
sex offender will be less likely to return to crime when pj, fj, and cj are at
relatively high levels. The portmanteau variable (uj) is a grab bag of other
influences, but it is helpful to conceive of it as capturing the quality of life
the offender can expect if he remains free from punishment, either because
he does not commit a crime or because he is not caught, convicted, and
punished for a crime he does actually commit.68 Another way to think of
this parameter is as the relative value of avoiding imprisonment: what a sex
offender stands to lose if he returns to crime. It also helps that, with this
frame, uj has an association with recidivism of the “same sign” as pj, fj, and
cj; in other words, as uj increases, the likelihood of committing a crime
drops, just as when pj, fj, and cj rise.
To evaluate the likely effect of a particular legal change on sex
offender recidivism, recognize that each variable begins at some initial
potential penalties defendants may pay, with higher penalties leading to lower probabilities of
conviction. This effect is evident in recent econometric studies on the deterrent effect of penalties that
show that higher penalties reduce the number of convictions.” (citations omitted)); Adriaan Lanni,
Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J.
1775, 1784–85 (1999) (arguing that jury nullification is likely to increase in response to overly harsh
determinate sentencing penalties); Paul Butler, Jurors Need to Know that They Can Say No, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/21/opinion/jurors-can-say-no.html?_r=0
(describing instances of jury nullification).
66
See J.J. Prescott, Deterrence and Criminal Sanction, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 7–9 (Jürgen Backhaus ed., 2015), http://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/
978-1-4614-7883-6_19-1 [https://perma.cc/TCZ4-XJH9].
67
To keep it all in one place, this model can be represented formally as Oj = Oj (pj, fj, cj, uj).
68
See Becker, supra note 37, at 177 (noting that an increase in uj reduces the incentive to engage
in illegal activity and therefore reduces the number of criminal offenses).
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value (e.g., a convicted sex offender might have a five percent chance of
being apprehended and convicted as a baseline), which then changes with
an innovation in policy. By being precise about the channels through which
a law might conceivably operate on criminal behavior and decision
making, we may be able to determine the range of possible effects that
might follow a law’s implementation and enforcement.69
Registration—sometimes referred to as private registration, in which
only law enforcement personnel are made aware of a registered offender’s
identity, location, and criminal history—operates by increasing the
likelihood that an offender’s commission of a crime will result in his
apprehension, conviction, and punishment. Registration allows law
enforcement officers to better monitor potential sex offender recidivists,
and when crime occurs, the police can look to registered offenders as
“usual suspects.”70 Both facets of the policy elevate pj.
With respect to fj, note that an already-registered offender does not
face longer sentences solely as a result of the enactment or application of a
SOPR law. Higher sentences for recidivist sex crimes are a distinct
phenomenon, as are “failure to comply” violations.71 Technically, it is
possible that a second offense might lead to a longer registration period
(which presumably results in some loss of utility, however discounted), but
registration obligations are already so long (sometimes lifelong) and would
only start to run upon the offender’s re-release,72 that this prospect seems
The primary purpose of SOPR laws is reducing recidivism rather than deterring “first time” or
“potential” offenders from committing their first sex offense, and so for sake of brevity, I discuss only
the effects these laws have on recidivism—i.e., the effects on the willingness of a convicted sex
offender who would be covered by these laws to commit another such offense. SOPR laws are
sufficiently salient, however, that they might indeed reduce crime simply by threatening potential
offenders with being subjected to these laws after they serve any sentence for a future crime. See
Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 19, at 168 (explaining how registration and notification laws may affect
a non-registered individual’s behavior by threatening to impose future burdens if he or she is convicted
of a sex crime). There is a great deal of variation in the scope and coverage of these laws, see id. at
166–67 (illustrating the differences in the timing and content of sex offender laws in a number of
states), and some SOPR laws apply to relatively small subsets of the overall class of what most would
consider “sex offenders,” id. at 182 n.35 (stating that one-third of the sampled states do not apply their
most stringent notification requirements to all registered sex offenders).
70
See Marissa Ceglian, Note, Predators or Prey: Mandatory Listing of Non-Predatory Offenders
on Predatory Offender Registries, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 843, 872 (2004) (“While the police cannot arrest a
registered sex offender based solely on his inclusion within the registry, they can pressure him to come
to the police station and question him as a suspect.”).
71
See Grant Duwe & William Donnay, The Effects of Failure to Register on Sex Offender
Recidivism, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 520, 520–21 (2010); Kristen M. Zgoba & Jill Levenson, Failure
to Register as a Predictor of Sex Offense Recidivism: The Big Bad Wolf or a Red Herring?, 24 SEXUAL
ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 328, 330–32, 340 (2011) (summarizing the literature on the significance
and causes of an offender’s failure to register and reporting findings that “cast[] doubt” on the belief
that failing to register is associated with heightened dangerousness).
72
Most sex offender registration obligations run from either conviction or release, whichever is
later. E.g., Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109–248, § 115, 120 Stat. 587,
69
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unlikely to matter at the margin. With respect to cj, at least in theory,
registration information remains confidential,73 and so community
members (including potential victims) are unable to make it more difficult
for a specific offender to locate and attack a victim, even if the information
can be used ex post to apprehend the offender.
Is there anything left to include in the portmanteau parameter uj?
SOPR laws, unlike criminal laws generally, impose affirmative obligations
on convicted sex offenders and often occasion further hardships through
police and third-party reactions to an individual’s SOPR status. Whereas
potential offenders are indifferent to changes in criminal law unless they
perceive some chance of being convicted of a crime, these affirmative
facets of SOPR laws are largely unavoidable;74 they apply to offenders
regardless of their behavior, including those who are veritable saints after
they reenter society.75 In its purest form, however, registration requires
relatively little—just information (and the regular delivery of that
information)—of those who are subject to it.76 Historically, offenders who
were privately registered had to regularly confirm or update their
information to law enforcement,77 satisfy procedural requirements,78 and
595 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16915 (2012)) (providing that “[a] sex offender shall keep the
registration current for the full registration period[,]” which is fifteen years, twenty-five years, or a
lifetime period depending on the severity of the crime, “excluding any time the sex offender is in
custody or civilly committed”).
73
Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 19, at 163.
74
Not everyone who might be considered a “sex offender” in the colloquial sense is required to
register. SOPR laws define the individuals covered by the laws, with coverage typically turning on
whether an individual committed one of a specific set of crimes, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2(b)
(West 2015) (defining a sex offense to be, inter alia, sexual assault or false imprisonment where the
victim is a minor and the offender is not the parent), and possibly, depending on the state, on a risk
assessment of the offender in question, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.46(e)(4) (West 2015)
(“Effective January 1, 2012, no person shall be excluded [from the sex offender registry] pursuant to
this subdivision [upon approval of an application to the Department of Justice] unless the offender has
submitted to the department documentation sufficient for the department to determine that he or she has
a SARATSO risk level of low or moderate-low.”).
75
In some circumstances, it is possible to petition a state to be removed from a sex offender
registry. Wayne A. Logan, Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender Registries, 2015 WIS. L. REV.
219, 227–30 (surveying a number of states’ lifetime registration mandates and their registry removal
procedures).
76
Exceptions to this rule include the registration requirements for sex offenders who are
homeless. Their obligations are more onerous. Homeless offenders are often required to check in once a
week, sometimes to multiple government agencies. E.g., McGuire v. Strange, 83 F. Supp. 3d 1231,
1239 (M.D. Ala. 2015) (describing the extensive registration burden on the homeless in the process of
declaring certain Alabama sex offender registration statutes unconstitutional (citing ALA. CODE §§ 1520A-4(13), 15-20A-12(b))).
77
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.414(1) (West 2015) (requiring a registration update within
three business days after any change of name, residence, employment, or student status). Historically,
registering by mail was often acceptable. See, e.g., Sex Offender Registration Bill Endorsed by House
Panel, ARKANSASONLINE (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2011/jan/21/sexoffender-registration-bill-endorsed-house-pane [https://perma.cc/344B-XL92] (noting that as of
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suffer occasional harassment at the hands of law enforcement. On paper,
registration obligations track the burdens of parole supervision.80 Yet, as
community notification has taken root, the scope and intensity of many of
these burdens has exploded.
Community notification—or public registration—builds on traditional
registration by making almost all of the information law enforcement
collects on registered offenders available to the public. How this
information is made public obviously matters, and early versions of these
statutes proceeded by allowing written requests for information, facilitating
public inspection of paper records, publishing notices in newspapers,
promoting community meetings, and, in more active jurisdictions, by
sending a postcard or even having a police officer spread the word to a
registrant’s nearby neighbors.81 Today, notification is best known in its
manifestation as a “web registry,” as mandated by federal law, through
which members of the public can search for registered offenders near a
particular address or for the location of a particular offender.82
As a well-defined extension of private registration, notification has
more complex implications for sex offender recidivism, at least in theory.
By deputizing community members to closely monitor individuals who
January 2011, “registration by mail [was] the . . . requirement under law). Today, in-person registration
is usually required. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 589.414(1) (requiring “appear[ance] in person”).
78
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-251(a) (2015) (“Any person who has been convicted or found
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or
a nonviolent sexual offense, and is released into the community on or after October 1, 1998, shall,
within three days following such release or, if such person is in the custody of the Commissioner of
Correction, at such time prior to release as the commissioner shall direct, and whether or not such
person’s place of residence is in this state, register such person’s name, identifying factors, criminal
history record, residence address and electronic mail address, instant message address or other similar
Internet communication identifier, if any, with the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public
Protection . . . .”).
79
Cf. id. (“During such period of registration, each registrant shall complete and return forms
mailed to such registrant to verify such registrant’s residence address and shall submit to the retaking of
a photographic image upon request of the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public
Protection.” (emphasis added)).
80
See TRAVIS, supra note 41, at 47. Travis reports a “significant expansion” in the numbers of
released offenders who are subject to parole supervision in recent years. Id. at 44–47. Parole
supervision affects many if not most released felons, yet at the same time, the imposition of parole
conditions is temporary. Id.
81
See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Effect of Megan’s Law on Sex Offender
Reintegration, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 49, 50 (2005) (describing the wide scope of notification
methods among the states (citing extensively SCOTT MATSON & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST.
FOR PUB. POLICY, COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION IN WASHINGTON STATE: 1996 SURVEY OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT (1996), http://pgn-stage.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1242/Wsipp_Community-Notificat
ion-in-Washington-State-1996-Survey-of-Law-Enforcement_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8EFNYHW])).
82
42 U.S.C. § 16918(a) (2012) (“[E]ach jurisdiction shall make available on the Internet . . . to
the public, all information about each sex offender on the registry.”); Levenson & Cotter, supra note
81, at 51.
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83

will be publicly known as sex offenders under the law, notification
further elevates the likelihood of punishment for the commission of a sex
crime (pj). Legislatures also intend community notification to foster
precautionary behavior,84 which is best modeled as an increase in the
offender’s cost of targeting a particular potential victim (cj). If a potential
victim learns that a neighbor has been convicted of a sex offense, not only
can she monitor the offender’s behavior for anything suspicious, but she
can also alter her personal behavior to reduce her risk of victimization.85
Precautionary behavior might include keeping a wide berth around the
registrant, sharing registration information, and altering daily routines.86
Notification laws may impose additional penalties (fj): e.g., extension
of notification period duration,87 reduction in the likelihood of exiting the
registry,88 and elevation of future risk assessment scores.89 But, as in the
case of registration, these penalties will occur years in the future, and even
if we ignore discounting, their significance is very uncertain. None of these
enhancements will matter in many jurisdictions,90 and even in jurisdictions
where they might, they will affect relatively few registrants.
The portmanteau variable (uj) may take on a much more important role
in the notification context than it does with registration, however. In the
83

For an extreme version of this, see Charles Lane, N.Y. County Outsources the Job of
Monitoring Sex Offenders, NPR (Aug. 25, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/24/214925854/n-ycounty-outsources-the-job-of-monitoring-sex-offenders [https://perma.cc/QYG7-PWQG].
84
E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-2(1) (2015) (“This release of information creates better awareness
and informs the public of the presence of sex offenders in the community, thereby enabling the public
to take action to protect themselves.”).
85
See Poco D. Kernsmith et al., The Relationship Between Sex Offender Registry Utilization and
Awareness, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 181, 182 (2009) (“The existence of these
registries provides the public with the perceived ability to avoid dangerous individuals . . . .”).
86
Anderson & Sample, supra note 31, at 387 (surveying Nebraska citizens on which, if any,
preventative measures they took in response to the publication of sex offender registration information,
and discovering measures that included, but were not limited to, “spread[ing] the word,” “locking the
door when I’m home alone,” and evicting a tenant whose name appeared on the registry).
87
See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §150/7 (West 2015) (“The registration period for any sex
offender who fails to comply with any provision of the Act shall extend the period of registration by 10
years beginning from the first date of registration after the violation.”).
88
See Logan, supra note 75, at 230 (indicating various ways an individual can be disqualified
from exiting a registry). Elsewhere, Logan notes that “very little or no realistic prospect of exit exists”
in most states. Id. at 233.
89
See Stephie-Anna Kapourales Frensler, Pennsylvania’s “Registration of Sexual Offenders”
Statute: Can It Survive a Constitutional Challenge?, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 563, 564–65, 565 n.11 (1998)
(describing the interplay between risk assessment determinations and notification practices in one
state). The federal registration law, 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a) (2012), has replaced the use of risk
assessment in evaluating offenders with a tier system.
90
Most states use crime of conviction and have lifetime notification periods. See, e.g., N.Y.
CORRECT. LAW § 168-h(2) (McKinney 2015) (“The duration of registration and verification for a sex
offender who, on or after March eleventh, two thousand two, is designated a sexual predator, or a
sexually violent offender, or a predicate sex offender, or who is classified as a level two or level three
risk, shall be annually for life.”).
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abstract, the only significant difference between a pure registration law and
a pure notification law is the disclosure of the registrant’s identity to the
public at large, and this disclosure is usually effected by law enforcement
or other government officials.91 The registrant himself does not have to
“do” much in a proactive sense to alert members of the public (as opposed
to alerting law enforcement officials). Unlike historical offenders who
were sentenced to time in stocks, the modern sex offender is not obligated
to present himself openly to the community for ridicule.92
In practice, though, notification today is coupled with many affirmative
obligations, which generate difficulties beyond the shame and knock-on
effects of publicity. As notification has replaced registration as the SOPR
baseline,93 the affirmative obligations associated with being a “registrant”
have ballooned.94 For instance, the modern publicly registered sex offender
often has to jump through a staggering number of hoops simply to travel to
another state.95 These can include obtaining travel permits and submitting
detailed travel plans in advance,96 and arriving in another state often
triggers new obligations there, even for a stay of just a few days.97 SOPR
91
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.728(7) (West 2015) (“The department shall make the public
internet website available to the public by electronic, computerized, or other similar means accessible
to the public. The electronic, computerized, or other similar means shall provide for a search by name,
village, city, township, and county designation, zip code, and geographical area.”); Prescott & Rockoff,
supra note 19, at 193 (noting that, historically, state laws have varied considerably in the restrictions
they place on access to registration information by the public).
92
See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 86 (2003) (rejecting the comparison of notification
requirements to public shaming punishments).
93
Community notification programs are required under federal law, so no pure form of
registration exists today. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16918, 16921 (2012) (requiring public access to sex
offender registry information and creating the Megan Nicole Kanka and Alexandra Nicole Zapp
Community Notification Program). This has been true for many years. See Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No.
104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345, 1345 (1996).
94
See Expert Report/Declaration of James J. Prescott, J.D., PhD at 10–12, Doe v. Snyder, 101 F.
Supp. 3d 672 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (No. 2:12-cv-11194), 2012 WL 12099604 (highlighting numerous
responsibilities and constraints placed on registered sex offenders).
95
See id. at 11–12 (reporting that registered sex offenders may be forced to register in other states
or face restrictions on where they stay while traveling); see also Plaintiffs’ Rule 52 Motion for
Judgment on the Papers at 26, Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672 (No. 2:12-cv-11194), 2014 WL 11033294
(contending that retroactive lifetime registration requirements create obligations that affect every aspect
of an individual’s life).
96
For instance, according to the law on the books, registrants in Alabama must obtain travel
permits if they intend to leave their county for more than two days. ALA. CODE § 15-20A-15 (2015).
The law requires a detailed travel itinerary if an offender will be away, or intends to be away, from
their registered residence for more than two days in Illinois, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3 (West
2015), for visits longer than two days in Alabama, ALA. CODE § 15-20A-15, and for visits longer than
five days in Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.105 (West 2015).
97
In Illinois and Maryland, registrants from other states must register if they stay for more than
two days. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3(a)(1); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 11-705(b)(5)(3)
(West 2015); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.63.010 (West 2015) (requiring registration in Alaska
by the next working day after arrival in the state); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-7(a) (West 2015)
(directing registrants to register in Indiana if they spend a week in the state over any six-month period).
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laws have mutated a convicted sex offender’s public obligations as well—
for example, offenders are sometimes required to renew their driver’s
licenses or ID cards more often than others, and they can be forced to carry
special cards at all times that indicate their status as a sex offender.98 Some
states even require that registered offenders conspicuously absent
themselves from particular holidays by posting warning signs in front of
their homes, or by secluding themselves with other sex offenders.99
One can speculate, however, that these affirmative duties pale in
comparison to the fallout of being publicly known as a convicted sex
offender.100 Criminal records alone are difficult enough for offenders to
overcome;101 most agree that carrying the label “sex offender” is an order
of magnitude more difficult to surmount.102 The many consequences are
diverse, but research often highlights a few key associations.
First, convicted sex offenders have a great deal of difficulty finding
employment.103 Although felons generally face challenges finding work,
employer and customer taste-based discrimination against sex offender
applicants rises to another level.104 True, even without notification, a
background check would presumably reveal to an employer that a
particular applicant was a convicted sex offender.105 But under notification,
98

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20A-18(a) (2015); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 322.141 (West 2015); IND.
CODE ANN. § 11-8-8-15 (West 2015); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-213, 55-50-353 (West 2015); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.060 (West 2015); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.057 (West 2015).
99
See Judge Tells Sex Offender to Put Up Signs, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2008),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-24-3294287324_x.htm [https://perma.cc/8XH5NVJD]; Anat Rubin, Is Halloween Really More Dangerous for Kids?: A Lack of Evidence Doesn’t Stop
Cities from Rounding Up Sexual Offenders on the Holiday, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/28/is-halloween-really-more-dangerous-for-kids [https://
perma.cc/DE7F-3X2Y].
100
There is a large literature on the “stigma” that results from a criminal record and the effect that
this might have on the willingness of individuals to engage in criminal behavior in the first place, as
well as the likelihood that the stigmatized offender returns to crime. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, On the
Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48 EURO. ECON. REV. 715, 716 (2004) (investigating
stigma as a crime deterrent); Kaku Furuya, A Socio-Economic Model of Stigma and Related Social
Problems, 48 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 281, 282–83 (2002) (describing the economic consequences of
stigma); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519,
520–32 (1996) (defining stigma, identifying its consequences for offenders, and modeling its effects on
offender behavior generally).
101
See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 246–74 (2015) (describing the
numerous legal limitations faced by those with a criminal record).
102
See Douglas N. Evans & Michelle A. Cubellis, Coping with Stigma: How Registered Sex
Offenders Manage Their Public Identities, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 593, 593–96 (2015) (explaining the
“harsh stigmatization” that sex offenders face in society).
103
Id. at 599.
104
See id. at 593, 599, 608 (examining the high unemployment rate among registered sex
offenders); see also Tewksbury, supra note 39, at 68–69, 75–76 (analyzing the percentage of registered
sex offenders who believe their status negatively affects their employment prospects).
105
Many states have employment restrictions, which prohibit sex offenders from working in
particular industries or occupations. In Louisiana, registrants cannot operate any bus, taxicab, or
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other employees and possibly customers would also learn of the applicant’s
status, reducing his likelihood of being hired.106 Second, sex offenders
have trouble securing stable, quality, reasonably priced housing.107 There
are many potential explanations for this phenomenon, but a palpable one is
discrimination on the part of landlords and harassment by neighbors.108
Third, pervasive public awareness that one has committed a sex crime
makes it difficult to form and maintain relationships, both with family
members (who might suffer from the association) and those with whom
one might wish to build a family.109
One particularly salient consequence of making the identities and
addresses of known sex offenders broadly available to the community is
the harassment and even violent assault that members of the public
sometimes inflict on registered offenders.110 Many, if not all, web registries
include language like the following, which is made conspicuous in large,
all-capital letters and in red type on the Connecticut sex offender registry:
“Any person who uses information in this registry to injure, harass or
commit a criminal act against any person included in the registry or any
other person is subject to criminal prosecution.”111
limousine, or work in any service position that would involve entering a residence. LA. STAT. ANN. §
15:553 (2015). Also, because sex offenders are sometimes prohibited from working in particular places
or under particular conditions, even an employer who wants to hire a sex offender may be unable to as
a result of activity restrictions. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.734 (West 2015) (prohibiting
registered sex offenders from working in or loitering in a “student safety zone”).
106
Cf. Max Chafkin, Megan’s Law and Your Business, INC. (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.inc.com/
magazine/20051101/priority-employees.html [https://perma.cc/LW72-M3W3] (advising employers to
search the national sex offender database before hiring employees).
107
Any person whose household includes a person subject to lifetime registration is barred from
accessing federally subsidized housing. 42 U.S.C. § 13663 (2012). Laws often make it difficult for
registered offenders to live together. In California, a registrant on parole may not live with any other
registrant in a “single family dwelling.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5(a) (West 2015). In Oregon,
registrants on probation, parole, or supervision may not “reside in any dwelling” together. OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 144.642 (West 2015). In Idaho and Oklahoma, a registrant may not live with more than
one other registrant. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8331 (West 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 590.1
(West 2015). Of these states, only California and Oklahoma provide statutory exceptions to allow
married or related registrants to live together.
108
See Tewksbury, supra note 39, at 75–76 (analyzing harassment data).
109
See Evans & Cubellis, supra note 102, at 601, 607–09 (reviewing some of the social and
psychological consequences that sex offenders encounter).
110
See Michael P. Lasher & Robert J. McGrath, The Impact of Community Notification on Sex
Offender Reintegration: A Quantitative Review of the Research Literature, 56 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 6, 10 (2012) (finding that almost ten percent of offenders surveyed
reported being the victims of vigilante attacks); Tewksbury, supra note 39, at 68, 75, 76, 78 (discussing
sex offender harassment); Steven Yoder, Life on the List, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.prospect.org/article/life-list [https://perma.cc/7EUY-JE22] (“There is also ample evidence
that . . . vigilantes have used sex-offender registries to threaten, harass, and inflict violence on hundreds
of offenders and their families.”).
111
Acknowledgement and Warning: Connecticut Sex Offender Registry, CONN. DEP’T
EMERGENCY SERVICES & PUB. PROTECTION, http://www.communitynotification.com/cap_office_dis
claimer.php?office=54567 [https://perma.cc/N32R-2PWF] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016).
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It is also worth adding that publicity and its associated consequences
may magnify the difficulties of complying with affirmative registration
duties. For example, if notification makes employment or housing more
difficult to obtain and maintain, offenders may be more likely to find
themselves without a place to live.112 Homelessness, in turn, generates
more onerous registration requirements, often including a weekly physical
appearance in one or more law enforcement agencies.113
In sum, although notification may work to reduce crime, all else equal,
by increasing the likelihood of crime detection (pj), the accompanying
notoriety may simultaneously produce a lonely, poor, and idle ex-offender
with no permanent connection to any community.114 Sociological evidence
suggests that unemployment, poverty, loneliness, and residency in a
disorganized community are factors that tend to increase recidivism risk.115
Accordingly, by lowering the portmanteau variable (uj), notification
increases the likelihood of recidivism, all else equal—i.e., not considering
its potentially offsetting effects on other parameters.
Residency restrictions are designed to function simply by increasing
the difficulty of attacking potential victims (cj).116 The assumptions
112

See John Zarrella & Patrick Oppmann, Florida Housing Sex Offenders Under Bridge, CNN
(Apr. 6, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/04/05/bridge.sex.offenders/ [https://perma.cc/7Q3JJ962] (highlighting the lack of available housing for sex offenders in Florida).
113
For instance, in Delaware, Illinois, and Washington, among other states, homeless registrants
must verify their registry information, in person, once a week. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 4121(k)(1) (West 2015) (“A Tier III sex offender designated as ‘homeless’ shall appear in person at
locations designated by the Superintendent of the Delaware State Police to verify all registration
information every week . . . .”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3(a) (West 2015) (“Any [sex offender] who
lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person, with the sheriff’s office of the county . . . or with
the chief of police in the municipality in which he or she is located.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.130(6)(b) (West 2015) (“A person who lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person,
to the sheriff of the county where he or she is registered.”).
114
There may be ways to remedy these concerns with respect to criminal records generally. See
Murat C. Mungan, Reducing Crime Through Expungements 1 (Jan. 4, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2711024 (describing the social benefits that may
derive from record expungement policies). But SOPR laws do not solely rely on information
dissemination, and when they do, information dissemination is the whole point. Still, it may well be
possible to tweak SOPR laws, at least at the margin, to improve their effects on recidivism. See supra
note 43 (acknowledging this possibility).
115
See Alex Friedmann, Lowering Recidivism Through Family Communication, PRISON LEGAL
NEWS (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2014/apr/15/lowering-recidivismthrough-family-communication/ [https://perma.cc/GMJ4-4XUA]
(summarizing studies that
demonstrate that “prisoners who maintain close contact with their family members while incarcerated
have better post-release outcomes and lower recidivism rates”).
116
SOPR laws are also popular, for better or worse, because they tend to make the public feel as if
the community is safer, even if the laws do not necessarily generate less recidivism. See Anderson &
Sample, supra note 31, at 386–87 (reporting survey respondent responses to whether they feel safer
after learning sex offender registry information); Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of Criminal
Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509, 551 (2013) (discussing the psychological
appeal of the community policing function as it relates to sex offender registries, and providing
supportive empirical evidence).
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underlying this category of SOPR laws are: 1) that potential victims, or at
least especially vulnerable victims, are geographically concentrated; and 2)
that the presence of sex offenders in places that are geographically
proximate to these vulnerable populations makes it easier for one of these
offenders to discover and prey on these would-be victims.117 Residency
restrictions are unlikely to alter punishment levels (fj) for recidivism for the
same reasons registration and notification laws are unlikely to do so. The
effect on the probability of punishment (pj), however, is unclear. The
chance of being apprehended will drop if sex offenders choose instead to
commit crimes in neighborhoods unfamiliar to them, where they are less
likely to be identified.118 But potential recidivists are also more likely to
live in clusters in less populated and more socially disorganized
neighborhoods.119 As such, these offenders may be easier to locate and
potentially arrest, but living in close quarters with other sex offenders and
relatively few others may hamper investigations,120 at least in the context
of sex offenses committed by offenders unknown to the victims.
Does anything remain in the residency restriction portmanteau?
Residency restrictions certainly do not make sex offenders’ lives easier.
They generally force offenders to live in worse neighborhoods with higher
crime rates121 and often keep them apart from their families.122 The
117
The first assumption is surely true if only because we teach children in schools and populations
are denser in certain areas. The second assumption, however, is much less certain. Sex offenders have
good reasons to prefer to offend away from the places where they live, work, and are therefore known,
despite the time and expense of travel and the difficulty of navigating a less familiar place. Indeed,
there is evidence that sex offenders are actually less likely to offend in their own neighborhoods, all
else equal. See Amanda Y. Agan & J.J. Prescott, Sex Offender Law and the Geography of
Victimization, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 786, 812 (2014) (“[S]ex offense victimization risks are
generally lower . . . in neighborhoods that have more [registered sex offender] residents.”).
118
In this sense, residency restrictions and community notification work at cross-purposes.
Residency restrictions are also likely to reduce candor and compliance regarding address information,
which may reduce the value of registration and notification.
119
See Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine et al., Social Disorganization and Residential Locations of
Registered Sex Offenders: Is This a Collateral Consequence?, 27 DEVIANT BEHAV. 329, 343 (2006)
(“The findings of this study show that communities with characteristics of social disorganization are
likely to be homes to a higher prevalence of registered sex offenders.”); Kelly M. Socia, Residence
Restrictions and the Association with Registered Sex Offender Clustering, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV.
441, 458 (2012) (stating that registered sex offenders were expected to be significantly more clustered
in disadvantaged areas).
120
If sex offenders feel that they are ill-used by the criminal justice system, they are less likely to
cooperate with police during investigations. See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 231, 265 (2008) (suggesting that people believe profiling by the police is unfair, and that “procedural
injustice leads to lowered legitimacy and diminished cooperation with the police”).
121
See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions:
1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 49 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 168, 169 (2005) (“The dispersal of parks and schools may lead to overlapping
restriction zones thus making it essentially impossible for sex offenders in some cities to find suitable
housing. In some urban areas, offenders might be forced to cluster in high-crime neighborhoods. Such
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restrictions are usually quite strict, eliminating a large majority of the
residential areas in most cities,123 which in all likelihood lengthens
commute times and other travel costs, and makes life generally more
taxing. Residency restrictions are also notoriously vague,124 which makes
compliance difficult and frustrating, and the relatively common shifting of
the relevant boundaries translates to sex offender transience.125 In theory,
sex offender ghettos might allow registered sex offenders to find a
community of individuals facing similar challenges. Moreover, living away
from “normal” neighborhoods might reduce the abuse and harassment that
often results from notification. Both of these dynamics would increase uj,
reducing recidivism, if all else were to remain equal. At the same time,
concentrations of sex offenders may engender more crime if 1) proximity
facilitates conspiracy,126 2) concentrations cause offenders to perceive their
transgressive behavior as normal,127 or 3) police are able to more easily
restrictions can lead to homelessness and transience, which interfere with effective tracking,
monitoring, and close probationary supervision.”).
122
See Jill S. Levenson & Andrea L. Hern, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Unintended
Consequences and Community Reentry, 9 JUST. RES. & POL’Y 59, 65 (2007) (“More than a third (37%)
reported that they were unable to live with supportive family members.”).
123
See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 121, at 169 (noting that sex offender restrictions may
further isolate offenders and may not “be a viable method for controlling sexual offender recidivism”);
see also Kristen M. Zgoba et al., Examining the Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions on
Housing Availability, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 91, 105 (2009) (“Because 80% of [Camden County,
New Jersey’s] population live in dwellings that fall within 2,500 ft of schools and day care centers, we
can infer that few residences would be deemed suitable for sex offenders if zoning laws were put in
place.”); Mary Beth Lane, Sex-Offender Ghettos, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 7, 2007),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2007/10/07/sexoff.new.ART_ART_10-07-07_A1_8884
374.html [https://perma.cc/9S6B-TSZD] (discussing the growing number of communities in Ohio that
have approved local ordinances further restricting where registered sex offenders may live and
reporting sex offenders clustering in certain locations as a result).
124
See, e.g., Doe v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 3d 672, 684 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (“SORA does not
provide sufficiently definite guidelines for registrants and law enforcement to determine from where to
measure the 1,000 feet distance used to determine the exclusion zones, and neither the registrants nor
law enforcement have the necessary data to determine the zones even if there were a consensus about
how they should be measured.”).
125
See Jill Levenson et al., Where for Art Thou? Transient Sex Offenders and Residence
Restrictions, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 319, 320 (2015) (“These well-intended laws appear to create
unintended consequences including transience, homelessness, and housing instability . . . .”); Corey
Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH.
U. L. REV. 101, 149–50 (2007) (discussing the uncertainty surrounding the implementation and
enforcement of sex offender residency restrictions).
126
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1312 (2003) (explaining the
dangers associated with group activity and “that groups cultivate a special social identity. This identity
often encourages risky behavior, leads individuals to behave against their self-interest, solidifies
loyalty, and facilitates harm against nonmembers”); cf. Prescott, supra note 40, at 98 (“[L]aw
enforcement strategies should focus on isolating released offenders from other potential offenders (and
perhaps also from potential victims, but not from employers, family, and friends) . . . .”).
127
Cf. Howard B. Kaplan et al., Social Psychological Perspectives on Deviance, in HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 563, 573–75 (John DeLamater & Amanda Ward eds., 2d ed. 2013)
(explaining that “[f]requently people are motivated to behave in ways that conform to the expectations
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harass offenders, all of which would result in a decline in the value of uj,
increasing recidivism.
GPS monitoring combines, in different measures, distinctive aspects of
registration and notification. In one sense, GPS monitoring operates like a
souped up form of registration. Rather than having relatively up-to-date
address, work, and other contact information, law enforcement officers
have data (or access to data) indicating an offender’s precise location at an
exact time or in real time. In practice, GPS monitoring is often passive—
i.e., as long as the GPS device is transmitting properly, no one is following
along in real time. But law enforcement can always inspect a detailed
record of the offender’s location ex post.128 This ability to reconstruct the
where and when of an offender’s day presumably dramatically improves
the prospect of crime detection, conviction, and ultimately punishment (pj),
which in theory should result in lower levels of recidivism.129
In another sense, GPS monitoring is akin to notification; people may
be able to observe the monitoring device, which puts them on notice and
may set them on edge, even if they do not know the offender personally or
the content of his record.130 One would guess that this visibility has the
effect of making the carrying out of at least particular aspects of crime
more challenging (cj).131 GPS monitoring might also heighten the difficulty
of committing a crime (cj) directly if (or when) real-time monitoring
became common. In such a world, law enforcement would be able to
intervene when the offender engaged in preparatory acts, so successfully
completing a crime would require “flying under the radar,” which would
surely take time and be costlier than preparation would otherwise be.
The portmanteau variable may also play a critical role in signing the
effect of GPS monitoring on recidivism. Life is no doubt worse when
wearing a monitor,132 which translates to a lower uj, even for those who
of members of their own groups, but by doing so deviate from the expectations of members of other
groups to which they do not belong and/or to which they do not desire to belong” and offering
supporting theory and pertinent evidence).
128
Sarah Turner et al., Does GPS Improve Recidivism Among High Risk Sex Offenders?
Outcomes for California’s GPS Pilot for High Risk Sex Offender Parolees, 10 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS
1, 5 (2015).
129
Stephen Gies et al., Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offenders with GPS, 29 CRIM. JUST. STUD. 1,
4–6 (2016).
130
Belleau v. Wall, No. 15-3225, 2016 WL 374111, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 29, 2016) (“When the
ankleted person is wearing trousers the anklet is visible only if he sits down and his trousers hike up
several inches and as a result no longer cover it. The plaintiff complains that when this happens in the
presence of other people and they spot the anklet, his privacy is invaded, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, because the viewers assume that he is a criminal and decide to shun him.”).
131
With respect to the effect of GPS monitoring, there is no obvious change in the absolute
severity of threatened future punishment (fj), unless something about the fact of wearing a monitor
itself leads to a change in the nature of the charge an offender believes might be filed against him.
132
Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1371 (2015) (describing GPS monitoring as
“intruding on a subject’s body”).
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otherwise serve as upstanding, law-abiding citizens. At our current level of
technology—but perhaps not in the future—GPS monitoring distorts every
aspect of an offender’s day.133 Maintaining the monitor and its connection
to law enforcement is not only expensive, but it requires almost ceaseless
charging, interferes with travel (even entering large buildings or
underground garages), renders bathing and sleeping difficult, and causes
physical irritation and pain.134 Additionally, many registrants are subject to
such monitoring for life, amplifying these effects.135
Although wearing a monitor may (or may not be) miserable,136 there
are countervailing considerations that may make the effect of GPS
monitoring on uj uncertain relative to the effect of notification on uj. It is
true that people who interact with a GPS-monitored offender may know to
be wary and on guard around him—even the many of those who never use
sex offender web registries or who are strangers to the offender (i.e., not
neighbors or acquaintances) and so could not easily use the registry to
learn of and about him.137 At the same time, an offender’s status and
criminal history is not linked explicitly to a name and an address and
133
For an excruciating picture of life with a GPS monitor, see Brief for ACLU of Michigan &
Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan as Amici Curiae at 43 app., People v. Cole, 817 N.W.2d 497
(Mich. 2012) (No. 143046), 2012 WL 697464 [hereinafter Brief for ACLU Michigan] (supplying an
appendix containing letters that detail the burdens of wearing a monitor written by sex offenders who
must wear them). But see Belleau, 2016 WL 374111, at *2 (“The type of anklet worn by the plaintiff is
waterproof to a depth of fifteen feet, so one can bathe or shower while wearing it. It must however be
plugged into a wall outlet for an hour each day (while being worn) in order to recharge it. There are no
restrictions on where the person wearing the anklet can travel, as long as he has access to an electrical
outlet. Should he move away from Wisconsin, he ceases having to wear it. And while he’s supposed to
pay a monthly fee to compensate for the cost of the anklet, the plaintiff in this case does not pay it and
the Department of Corrections appears not to have tried to compel him to do so.”).
134
See Brief for ACLU Michigan, supra note 133, at 20 (“A number of the letter writers note that
these devices make it difficult to bathe . . . at least some of the devices are heavy and can be tight when
attached, causing pain and discomfort, and making it difficult to sleep. Multiple writers report that their
devices rub their skin raw.”).
135
See Belleau, 2016 WL 374111, at *14 (asserting that pedophilia is a lifelong affliction and that
lifetime monitoring is not punitive); see also Steve Carmody, Lifetime Electronic Monitoring of Some
Sex Offenders Might Violate the Constitution, MICH. RADIO (Mar. 31, 2015), http://michiganradio.org/p
ost/lifetime-electronic-monitoring-some-sex-offenders-might-violate-constitution#stream/0 [https://per
ma.cc/8BEW-NFHK] (reporting that eight states require “some sex offenders to wear a monitor for
life”).
136
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text. In my analysis, I assume that the disutility of
incarceration in prison is unaffected by SOPR laws. Wearing a GPS monitor reduces uj either way, but
if the severity of prison increases (fj) by a sufficient amount (determined by the offender’s preferences),
then an offender’s behavior need not change at all (even assuming no change in pj or in the length of
prison sentence (another dimension of fj)). One could imagine combining SOPR laws with especially
harsh prison conditions to achieve this balance, but the Constitution and practical considerations limit
policymakers’ freedom to innovate in this direction.
137
See Andrew J. Harris & Rebecca Cudmore, Community Experience with Public Sex Offender
Registries in the United States: A National Survey, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 1, 4–5 (2016),
http://cjp.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/01/25/0887403415627195.abstract [https://perma.cc/F5MRGG24] (indicating relatively low sex offender registry awareness and usage levels).
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138

placed (potentially) forever on the internet. Monitoring devices can
always be removed.139 Off the internet, out of mind?
The type of “notice” these two SOPR laws give to the community and
potential victims is thus different, and so their consequences may also be
different. Despite the scarlet letter-like aspect of wearing something on
your body that may be visible to everyone,140 GPS monitoring may matter
less to uj than notification. Compare to this situation the arguments
revolving around the “Ban the Box” campaign, which is premised not on
the idea that employers and others will not eventually discover that an
individual has a criminal record, but rather on the idea that unearthing that
information at a later stage of the hiring or contracting process might give
employers the cognitive ammo to overcome any distaste for an otherwise
qualified applicant.141 Consequently, employment may be easier to obtain,
and relationships may be easier to begin. GPS monitoring may for the
same reason leave a smaller footprint than notification does by making a
potentially smaller circle of people aware of an offender’s status typically
only at or after an initial face-to-face meeting.142
***
In this part of the Article, I have explicitly linked the operation and
consequences of four SOPR laws—registration, notification, residency
restrictions, and GPS monitoring—to the four parameters that drive sex
offending behavior in a simple economic model of crime. With the
possible exception of registration, all of the laws are likely to significantly
shift Becker’s portmanteau variable (uj), which will in turn influence
tendencies to recidivism. The portmanteau variable is all-important in the
SOPR context because these laws apply regardless of whether the offender
138

See JACOBS, supra note 101, at 30–31 (explaining the need to balance aiding law enforcement
in preventing future crimes with protecting individual civil liberties and personal information from
being accessed through the internet).
139
See Belleau, 2016 WL 374111, at *2 (suggesting that a monitored sex offender would no
longer have to wear his monitor if he left the state).
140
See Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 985 N.E.2d 1179, 1186 (Mass. 2013) (referring to GPS
monitoring as “a modern-day scarlet letter” (citing Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 196 n.18
(Mass. 2009))).
141
Annie-Rose Strasser, How One Box Locks Thousands of Americans Out of Employment and
into a Life of Crime, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2014), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/02/13/
3283081/ban-box-movement/ [https://perma.cc/5QWR-7EXE] (“Employers can still ask whether the
applicant has committed a crime, but they can’t do it on initial job applications. And Williams said
that’s eliminated the automatic discrimination that never let him get his foot in the door.”).
142
In this sense, future generations of GPS monitoring technology—which will likely be smaller,
lighter, more comfortable, more efficient, and more reliable—may represent the successful “tweak”
that SOPR laws need to succeed at reducing recidivism: in effect, a SOPR law that is more effective
than registration (almost by definition) and perhaps better able than notification to reduce recidivism by
boosting the traditional economic model of crime parameters while also enhancing the value of the
portmanteau parameter (ui) relative to notification. See supra note 43.
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behaves well. The primary consequence of this feature is that sex offenders
experience the criminogenic burdens of these laws even when traditional
channels—changes in pj, fj, and cj—are unable to reduce recidivism risk. I
show in the next Part that under certain conditions, such laws will actually
increase recidivism levels and therefore the social costs of crime while
simultaneously draining law enforcement resources from other more
fruitful areas—a double whammy.
IV. ANALYSIS
The portmanteau variable performs a critical role in understanding the
potential consequences of SOPR laws for criminal recidivism. In short, the
design of current SOPR laws effectively ensures a negative relationship—
an inherent trade-off—between the “traditional” economic model of crime
parameters and the portmanteau variable.143 SOPR laws that work by
increasing the likelihood of detection (pj), which makes returning to crime
less attractive all else equal, also seem invariably to reduce the quality of
life for registered sex offenders (uj). As a result, reoffending becomes less
costly to offenders, and recidivism becomes more likely.144 The question of
which effect dominates is an empirical one, and the answer depends on the
particulars of the law and the nature of each individual sex offender. Yet
the fixity of this trade-off remains, and derives from the fact that SOPR
laws impose significant costs on sex offenders regardless of whether they
engage in criminal activity.145
Importantly, general criminal laws and sentencing enhancements are
different in this regard.146 These laws can be counterproductive in a range
143

To be clear, it is conceivable that there could be a positive relationship if it were the case that
SOPR laws, like other re-entry laws, made life easier, better, etc., post-release. Unfortunately, re-entry
program components—housing assistance, job training, etc.—are missing from SOPR laws.
144
Alissa R. Ackerman & Meghan Sacks, Can General Strain Theory Be Used to Explain
Recidivism Among Registered Sex Offenders?, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 187, 191 (2012) (defining strain as the
imposition of negative stimuli, the loss of positive stimuli, and the inability to achieve goals, and
finding that recidivism is more likely among those individuals reporting high levels of strain).
145
See Michael P. Lasher & Robert J. McGrath, The Impact of Community Notification on Sex
Offender Reintegration: A Quantitative Review of the Research Literature, 56 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 6, 19–20 (2012) (describing the negative consequences associated
with notification policies, including job loss and relocation, and noting that such policies may increase
the risk of reoffending for offenders categorized as being low-risk for recidivism).
146
I acknowledge that SOPR laws are in fact criminal laws in the sense that refusing to comply
with them produces criminal penalties. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2012) (“Each jurisdiction, other
than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term
of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the
requirements of this subchapter.”). Yet SOPR laws target the reduction of other criminal behavior—sex
crimes—and the failure to comply with SOPR laws is harmful only to the extent it facilitates (directly
or indirectly) the commission of a later sex crime. Therefore, when considering “recidivism” I am, like
policymakers, concerned solely with the effect of SOPR laws on sex offense recidivism, not the almosttautological fact that enacting a SOPR law will lead to an increase in the violation of that law.
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of ways, and there can be negative spillovers that affect the innocent—
even causing them to turn to crime—to the point of swamping any social
gains from enforcement.148 But it is hard to imagine circumstances in
which enforcing or threatening to enforce a criminal law against an
individual can push that individual to commit that crime when, absent the
law at issue, he would otherwise have abstained.149 If we ignore the
portmanteau variable (uj), increasing enforcement levels (pj), making
penalties more severe (fj), and directly hindering the commission of crime
(cj) ought to have theoretically unambiguous effects: less recidivism. The
traditional parameters all point in the same direction,150 and with criminal
laws, the traditional parameters are essentially all that matter.151 Indeed, it
is our natural tendency to focus on the likely consequences of these
parameters alone that makes SOPR laws instinctively sound so attractive as
policy innovations.152
Unfortunately, the portmanteau variable may be ascendant in the
SOPR context. Although it is a hodge-podge of different considerations
and consequences, this typically ignored bundle simply cannot be ignored
when seeking to understand and reform these post-release laws. The effects
of SOPR laws on the traditional parameters of criminal behavior may well
be relatively minor when compared to their portmanteau effects.
147
Enforcement may be counterproductive, especially when the effects of punishment are
concentrated. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in
African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–97 (2004) (describing theories of
community harm such as weak social networks with family and kin, disorganized communities, out-ofbalance gender populations, and the destruction of social citizenship). Even assuming that some antisocial behavior must be forbidden, the medicine for those who cross the line can be worse (from
society’s perspective) than the sickness, if punishment destroys the ability of individuals or
communities to contribute to society. Cf. Robert J. Sampson & Charles Loeffler, Punishment’s Place:
The Local Concentration of Mass Incarceration, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 20, 29 (noting that
communities with high rates of incarceration are harmed by the removal of individuals from these
communities and the subsequent limitations on reintegration that these individuals face upon return).
148
For example, a criminal law may punish an offender who commits a crime, and as a result of
that punishment, the offender’s son may himself eventually turn to crime, when in the counterfactual,
the son would have shunned criminality. Here, the focus is on SOPR laws and the behavior of a single
person in response to the application of those laws to him (and not his father).
149
But see infra note 183 (identifying possible Giffen behavior scenarios).
150
See SCHMIDT & WITTE, supra note 44, at 165–83; Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 49
(manuscript at 1–3).
151
Admittedly, criminal laws can, upon conviction, also lead to stigma, which does affect the
portmanteau variable in at least the same direction as SOPR laws, if not to the same extent. However,
the stigma that results from a criminal conviction is distinct from the formal penalties of the law itself,
and can therefore be adjusted or eliminated, at least in some contexts. See Mungan, supra note 114, at
2–3 (outlining the potential value of using expungements more strategically to reduce the social stigma
that arises from conviction for particular individuals).
152
See, e.g., Levenson & D’Amora, supra note 11, at 172–75, 180, 192 (describing the disconnect
between sex offender policy and research, accounting for the appeal of SOPR policies to members of
the public, and describing how inaccurate “beliefs . . . provoke the development of policies created on
the basis of ‘common knowledge’ that lack empirical support”).
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In this Part, I clarify the conditions under which recidivism might
increase following the introduction of a SOPR law, a consequence that
would almost surely result from changes in the value of the portmanteau or
“quality of life” parameter.153 SOPR laws are varied and work in
complicated ways, so I begin by moving from the discussion of specific
SOPR laws to an abstract, generic SOPR law, after which I home in on the
necessary conditions for an increase in recidivism. Finally, I consider
precisely how these conditions might hold in practice.
***
The consequences of implementing a SOPR law will depend not only
on the kind of law and its specific features, but also on the “preferences” of
the individuals to whom the law is applied.154 Of course this is always true,
but because of the prominence of the portmanteau variable in the SOPR
setting, these laws have the real possibility of making recidivism more,
rather than less, likely. By contrast, while criminal laws and sentencing
reforms may be ineffective, they are not nearly as likely to backfire in a
direct way by causing the offender to prefer to commit more crime. 155 The
following is a rough summary of how basic SOPR laws are likely to affect
the parameters of the economic model of crime for a “typical” offender,
although, as a rough summary, it will be inaccurate for some:156

153

It is conceivable, although very unlikely, that SOPR laws might be counterproductive without
portmanteau effects and without spillovers to other people, depending on the preferences of the
potential offender. This might also be true in the context of normal criminal laws. I discuss this
possibility in infra note 183.
154
“Preferences” is the term economists use to describe how behavioral “inputs” are turned into
“behavior.” So, when a good’s price increases, a person’s preferences for that item, and other items,
along with a budget constraint, allow us to predict what the person will do in response to the change.
See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 169
(2000) (collecting various definitions of preferences, including Paul Samuelson’s definition of
preferences in terms of what people tend to actually choose and Gary Becker’s definition of preferences
in broad, universal terms).
155
Certain reforms to criminal laws might backfire if conviction under those laws brings stigma (a
separate choice, potentially, see Mungan, supra note 114). Consider the following example: A reform
reduces sentence length (fj) and increases detection probabilities (pj) for a crime such that the expected
sanction for the crime remains the same. This scenario results in more sentences, but shorter ones. If
criminal records are made public, if stigma turns on the fact of a conviction alone, and stigma increases
recidivism risk, then in theory the likelihood of recidivating will increase following the reform.
156
The symbols mean the following: ↑ = increases; ↑↑ = substantially increases; ↔ = neither
increases nor decreases; ↓ = decreases; ↓↓= substantially decreases.
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To generalize, existing SOPR laws work by increasing the likelihood
of apprehension, conviction, and punishment (pj) and by increasing the cost
of targeting and attacking a victim (cj).157 These laws probably matter little
in terms of increasing the severity of punishment (fj). But every SOPR law
seems to reduce the value of the portmanteau variable by a nontrivial
amount (with the possible exception of bare-bones registration laws).
There are differences across these laws, but in general, SOPR laws do
increase (or at least do not reduce) the values of all of the traditional
variables found in standard economic models of crime. But, again, they
also simultaneously reduce the value of the portmanteau variable.
At this point, it makes sense to revisit the definition and scope of the
portmanteau variable in light of Part III’s discussion.158 The traditional
parameters (pj, fj, cj) capture the costs associated with the commission of
(or the attempt to commit) a crime. The portmanteau variable captures
everything else that might plausibly affect someone’s desire to engage in
criminal activity.159 This includes how much an individual benefits from
committing the crime in question, an individual’s impulsiveness or other
behavioral characteristics that are conducive to criminal behavior, etc.160
Fortunately, for the present analysis, we need only focus on those aspects
of the portmanteau—uj—that change in response to the enactment and
enforcement of a SOPR law. This translates to asking: other than
increasing the likelihood of detection and the cost of committing an
offense, how do these laws alter a potential offender’s environment, and
how are these environmental changes likely to impact behavior?
To reiterate the conclusion of Part III, SOPR laws necessarily make
life more difficult for those individuals who are subject to them.161 For
many convicted offenders, these laws make their lives lonelier, more
poverty-ridden, idle, and less connected.162 What influence are these life
changes likely to have on an individual’s tendencies to commit crime?
157

Supra text accompanying notes 70–80 (registration); supra text accompanying notes 81–115
(community notification); supra text accompanying notes 116–27 (residency restrictions); supra text
accompanying notes 128–41 (GPS monitoring).
158
See supra text accompanying notes 67–68.
159
Becker, supra note 37, at 177.
160
See id. (noting that the portmanteau variable encompasses other variables that bear on an
individual’s willingness to commit a crime, including the financial gain or other benefits from
committing a crime as compared to not committing a crime).
161
It seems safe to claim that life is never easier under these laws, but it also seems clear that the
difficulties that result from these laws are disproportionately larger for those with fewer financial and
other resources. To the extent that these individuals are already at higher risk of returning to crime,
SOPR laws may be particularly criminogenic.
162
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:553 (2015) (detailing restriction on sex offenders’ employment
opportunities); Anderson & Sample, supra note 31, at 372 (describing the isolating steps individuals
reported taking after finding out that individuals in their communities were on sex offender registries);
Hobson, supra note 6, at 963 (noting that many states impose restrictions on where sex offenders can
work or travel).
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Scholars often characterize these impairments as exacerbating recidivism
risk factors—i.e., they increase someone’s propensity to commit (or to
return to) crime.163 These behavioral claims are grounded in sociological or
psychological theory,164 but they have also been empirically validated.165
Much of this research has no theoretical link to an economic model of
crime (i.e., deterrence considerations). For instance, it is not necessarily the
case that poverty increases an individual’s likelihood of committing a
crime because a poor person is better able to evade detection (pj) or for
some reason fears punishment less (fj).166
Neoclassical economists do think in terms of deterrence, however, and
so they ask a slightly different question: how does increasing poverty,
loneliness, idleness, and disconnectedness alter the potential offender’s
(perhaps subconscious) calculation of the costs and benefits of committing
a crime? Two broad possibilities come to mind. First, the benefits of
committing crime may increase for the offender living in this new
environment. This idea makes the most sense in the context of economic
crimes, but it might also explain other crimes if legal substitutes to those
activities are off the table.167 Second, the costs of committing a crime may
decrease under the new conditions. This possibility speaks directly to the
intuition that if the law is to successfully deter potential offenders from
committing crimes, it has to be able to take something of value from
them.168 The offender must have something to lose.
All of this leads to a straightforward conclusion: a SOPR law will
render convicted sex offenders more likely to recidivate when the policy
reduces uj by an amount sufficient to increase an offender’s tendency to
163
See, e.g., Lindsay A. Wagner, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: How Common Sense
Places Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 175, 175–76 (2009) (“[Residency restrictions] are illadvised policy choices based on faulty reasoning. They aggravate recidivism risk factors, and hence
may actually make communities less safe.”).
164
Ackerman & Sacks, supra note 144, at 191.
165
See Wagner, supra note 163, at 195 (summarizing a number of empirical studies that support
the conclusion that removing sex offenders from their communities and support systems, thereby
alienating them, increases the risk of recidivism).
166
See, e.g., STINSON ET AL., supra note 32, at 127–28 (defining and describing the male
deprivation hypothesis).
167
See, e.g., Harry M. Hoberman, Personality and Sexual Offending; Non-Sexual Motivators and
Disinhibition in Context, in SEXUAL OFFENDING 119, 158 (Amy Phenix & Harry M. Hoberman eds.,
2016) (depicting the lack of belonging and connection to other human beings as a likely cause of sexual
offending: “select sexual offenders seek out interactions with adults, adolescents, and children out of a
desire to belong”).
168
ANGELA DEVLIN & BOB TURNEY, GOING STRAIGHT AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 12, 31–
32 (1999) (“[I]t is clear that the more people have to lose and the more they become stakeholders in
society—not just in monetary terms but by being valued in their work and in their relationships—the
less likely they are to reoffend, and moving away from crime becomes a cumulative process. [One
interviewee] sums up the feelings of many: . . . ‘Actually I couldn’t give a toss about going back to
prison. The deterrent for me is what I would lose if I went back inside. It isn’t prison itself, it’s all the
things I have got now in my life: a job, a relationship—things I don’t want to lose.’”).
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engage in crime by more than the policy’s increase of pj and/or cj reduces
the offender’s tendency to engage in crime.169 It is helpful to break this
calculation down into two different parts. Whether a SOPR law increases
or decreases crime depends, first, on how much the law affects the
parameter levels (pj, cj, and uj) themselves for an individual,170 and second,
on the level or extent of influence those changes in parameter levels have
on an individual’s likelihood of returning to crime,171 whether through a
direct or an indirect channel.172 One can appreciate these dynamics by
considering the range of potential consequences that might attend the
enactment and implementation of a community notification law. By
varying one or two of these important inputs while holding everything else
constant, simple hypotheticals suffice to illustrate the different channels
through which a newly implemented notification law might lead to higher
recidivism levels among registered sex offenders:173
169
More formally, assume that si indicates the extent to which offender i is subject to a SOPR law,
and that the function that defines the relationship between the decision to reoffend and the parameters
of the economic model of crime is characterized, as before, as:





Oij  Oij pij , f ij , cij , uij .

If we ignore the small effect a SOPR law is likely to have on the severity of punishment, an offender
becomes more likely to commit offense j if:
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Or, rearranging:
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pij si cij si
uij si
170

For example, if a sex offender commits a sex offense, how much does the probability of
detection by law enforcement actually increase? Or, for someone covered by the SOPR law, how much
more difficult does committing a sex crime become? An increase in a traditional parameter is
equivalent to an increase in price.
171
The second part captures the role of preferences in determining the behavioral response. As the
probability of detection increases, some individuals may not respond at all, some may respond a bit,
and others a lot. Formally, this facet is represented by the shape of the Oij function.
172
Although I assume away general equilibrium effects, they may also play a role, although I
suspect a minor one. For instance, different SOPR laws might affect the quality of housing or
employment practices with respect to registered sex offenders, which will in turn affect offender
behavior. See Kenneth Burdett, Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1764, 1764
(2003) (noting that two identical neighborhoods may have different amounts of crime based in part on
good—i.e., high-wage—jobs, and further noting that when the crime rate falls the relative benefits to
legitimate activity increase, reducing the incentive to be a criminal). More likely is that SOPR laws will
affect whether someone is convicted of a sex crime in the first place. See Elizabeth J. Letourneau et al.,
The Effects of Sex Offender Registration and Notification on Judicial Decisions, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV.
295, 312 (2010) (finding that South Carolina’s SORN law implementation was associated with sex
crime charges being reduced to non-sex charges).
173
Here, I assume that offenders are rational, calculating the costs and benefits of their actions,
including criminal behavior. This notion is a useful way to identify key moving parts, but it should be
taken with the grains of salt liberally sprinkled at the beginning of Part II.
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1) Optimistic and Patient Offender: The notification law
increases the likelihood that the offender is captured, but by
assumption, this offender is indifferent to this change
because he believes (falsely) that he can avoid detection just
as easily as before. The law also increases his costs of
targeting a victim, and notification alerts many potential
victims to the offender’s status. But, by assumption again,
this offender is extremely patient, and is not bothered by a
long search.174 From his perspective, therefore, the law does
not increase the costs of committing a crime. His status
makes him a pariah in his neighborhood, however, and he
loses his job.175 The law thus reduces what he has to lose, and
this increases his likelihood of recidivating.
2) Clever and Non-Threatening Offender: This offender is
sensitive to increases in the likelihood of detection that result
from the implementation of notification, but because the
offender is clever, he knows (perhaps subconsciously) that he
will be able to commit a sex crime with no increase in his
personal likelihood of being detected. The offender also lacks
patience; an increase in targeting costs would reduce his
interest in recidivating. But the notification law actually has
no effect on his ability to locate a victim because he is
perceived by others as non-threatening. Potential victims do
not steer clear of him notwithstanding his now-known status
as a sex offender. He thus does not perceive a change in the
cost or difficulty of recidivating. This offender is laid off,
however, and he regards registration as extremely degrading.
Consequently, his likelihood of reoffending increases.
3) Sensitive and Poor Offender: Neither optimistic nor
patient, this offender is also incapable of shielding himself
from higher detection probabilities, and publicity about his
status makes it harder for him to reoffend. With respect to
this offender, notification thus seems likely to work. Yet the
offender is particularly sensitive to his pariah status, and the
notification regime leaves him depressed. Moreover, he loses
his job, his housing, and his connections to others. If he were
174

I assume for purposes of this example that targeting costs rise for covered offenders because
many, but not all, of the best targets now engage in precautionary behavior. Search, therefore, requires
more time. Someone has to value time, however, to consider a longer search for a victim to be a “cost”
and thus to produce a change in behavior.
175
Imagine in this case that while his employer does not have a problem hiring individuals with
certain criminal records, the fact that his customers begin to object to his employing a registered sex
offender is sufficient for the employer to dismiss him.
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well-off financially, he may have been partially insulated
from these latter effects. In his particular case, the increases
in the probability of detection and in the cost of targeting a
victim are not sufficient to offset the misery he now
experiences. He determines that he does not care whether he
has to go back to prison because it is no worse than his
current situation, and so the likelihood of him returning to
crime increases.
These examples illustrate several ways SOPR laws might affect the
behavior of an individual registered sex offender. In just a few paragraphs,
I turn to a discussion of how to think about translating this method of
modeling an individual’s behavior to the question of whether recidivism
rates should increase in response to the implementation of a SOPR law.
First, however, I draw out the lessons from the hypotheticals above, and
identify a few of the most obvious reasons why SOPR laws might increase
(or at least fail to decrease) an offender’s recidivism risk.
To begin with, there are compelling reasons to believe that SOPR laws
may fail to raise the values of the traditional model parameters in any
significant way. In the case of community notification, as I have noted
elsewhere,176 much has to be true in order for these SOPR laws to work to
increase pj and cj. First, someone must access the registry information and
find a registrant who realistically poses a threat.177 Second, that someone
has to be newly informed by what he or she learns about the registrant. 178
Third, the information has to be useful to the newly informed person—i.e.,
she must be either in a position to effectively monitor the offender or a
potential victim who can take effective precautionary steps.179 Finally, it
176

J.J. Prescott, Do Sex Offender Registries Make Us Less Safe?, 35 REGULATION 48, 55 (2012).
See Anderson & Sample, supra note 31, at 371 (“The results [from Nebraska respondents]
suggest that the majority of citizens had not accessed registry information, although the majority of
people knew the registry existed . . . .”); Harris & Cudmore, supra note 137, at 18 (“Forty-five percent
of our sample reported having accessed an SOR at least once, and only 7.2% of [the] overall sample
indicat[ed] that they were unaware of the registry’s existence. These national estimates of SOR usage
and awareness are moderately higher than those rates reported in previous surveys . . . .”).
178
As is well known, a large majority of victims are related to or know their attackers. See ERIC S.
JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE
PREVENTATIVE STATE 3 (2006); Yung, supra note 22, at 453–54 (asserting that the “stranger danger”
myth obscures the reality that rape and child molestation are predominantly committed by persons
known to the victim). With respect to family members, in particular, it seems unlikely that registry
information will newly inform. Even for those who are newly informed, we must ask whether they
would have learned about the offender’s status in short order anyway had the notification regime not
been in place—i.e., did they just learn the information sooner than they otherwise would have?
179
Anderson & Sample, supra note 31, at 388 (“Despite federal legislation mandating public
access to sex offender registries, it seems that the majority of people in Nebraska do not proactively
seek sex offender information using the Internet-based sex offender registry. A lack of awareness of the
registry cannot explain this finding, as most people reported being aware of the availability of sex
offender information.”); Rachel Bandy, Measuring the Impact of Sex Offender Notification on
177
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must be the case that there are enough newly informed people who can use
the information effectively to make committing a new crime more difficult
for the offender. Those are a lot of necessary steps.
Importantly, the same basic analysis does not apply to whether an
individual’s portmanteau parameter drops significantly in value in response
to the implementation of a notification law. In particular, employers and
landlords are much more likely to search out notification information
merely on the chance that the public may become aware of it. Also, it
stands to reason that those who are most at-risk (family members, friends,
acquaintances) are not only more likely to already be aware of the
offender’s criminal history, but may also form the set of people least likely
to harass the offender in question on the basis of that history. In other
words, it may well be that notification supplies information to those least
likely to benefit from it and most likely to use it to cause harm to the
offender. Finally, while it may not be all that easy for someone to use
notification information to engage in effective precautionary behavior,
spreading notification information to others (and thereby magnifying its
negative consequences) is easy.180 Indeed, spreading the word is by far the
most common behavioral response to registry information.181
For residency restriction laws, the analysis is more straightforward, but
equally speculative. Simply, do residency restrictions in fact make it more
difficult for an offender to locate and attack a victim? 182 By contrast, GPS
monitoring seems more likely to be effective, at least for offenses likely to
be reported. The ability of law enforcement to place an individual at the
scene of the crime seems highly probative for identifying the offender,
apprehending him after the crime, and proving his guilt at trial.
If we assume SOPR laws increase the “price” of committing another
sex crime at least somewhat, under what circumstances might the offender
become more likely to reoffend? There seems to be one realistic possibility
that emerges from the economic model of criminal behavior:183 the SOPR
Community Adoption of Protective Behaviors, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 237, 255 (2011)
(“[T]his study found no statistically significant relationship between receiving notification about a
high-risk sex offender and the adoption of self-protective behaviors, controlling for differences in
sociodemographics and neighborhood type.”); Harris & Cudmore, supra note 137, at 17.
180
Cf. Jacob Hornik et al., Information Dissemination via Electronic Word-of-Mouth: Good News
Travels Fast, Bad News Travels Faster!, 45 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 273, 277–78 (2015) (reporting
experiments showing that not only were subjects more sensitive to negative information but they also
disseminated it more frequently and to more recipients over longer periods of time).
181
Harris & Cudmore, supra note 137, at 17.
182
The answer to this question in all probability depends on the nature of the offender. A pure
impulse criminal may possibly be affected, but anyone else seems capable of travelling a few thousand
feet (or a few miles) to find a victim. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 121, at 174 (“[M]any
respondents pointed out that they have always been careful not to reoffend in close proximity to their
homes, so geographical restrictions provided little deterrence.”).
183
There is also a less realistic possibility. Economists long ago identified the theoretical
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law that increases the “price” of committing a sex crime also dramatically
reduces the value of the portmanteau variable—i.e., reduces the quality of
life relative to life in prison. In other words, even if SOPR laws work as
our intuition suggests they ought to (i.e., making crime detection more
likely and increasing search and targeting costs), these laws also influence
an offender’s behavior through other channels, and in some settings, these
“indirect” effects can more than offset their direct effects. This possibility
seems more probable the less effective SOPR policies are at increasing pj
and cj. One can easily identify—especially in individual cases—incredibly
intrusive aspects of SOPR laws that realistically make no difference to pj
and cj, but that are sure to lower uj. One easy-to-point-to example is that
many of these laws charge offenders fees for the SOPR “services” they
receive. GPS monitoring devices require a monthly fee, for instance, and
sex offenders are often expected to pay it.184 One can understand the
sentiment behind this policy choice;185 yet, at the same time, its practical
effect is to drive most offenders deeper into poverty,186 or worse,187 neither
of which is likely to be a recipe for rehabilitation.
conditions under which an increase in the price of a good (increase in the cost of behavior) might
actually lead to more consumption of the good (more of the behavior) in question. Situations that
satisfy these conditions—called “Giffen” situations—occur when the income effect of the price change
overwhelms the substitution effect. At least in theory, something akin to this dynamic could happen in
the SOPR context, but Giffen situations are rare, and would also likely require a significant “price”
increase, which seems unlikely, except perhaps in the context of GPS monitoring. A classic (although
perhaps historically inaccurate) example comes out of the potato famine in Ireland. The price of
potatoes increased by so much that people could no longer afford meat, and were forced to buy even
more potatoes to ingest sufficient calories. See John E. Davies, Giffen Goods, the Survival Imperative,
and the Irish Potato Culture, 102 J. POL. ECON. 547, 549–50 (1994) (discussing the ensuing survival
imperative when a consumer is reduced to subsistence levels and must actually increase his
consumption of a price-increased commodity, such as potatoes). In the sex offender context, imagine
that an offender is engaged in some level of undetected crime or in behavior that is borderline criminal
(i.e., he is “consuming” some level of sex crime). The legislature now enacts a SOPR law that increases
the cost or enforcement (detection) level. In the abstract, the offender might determine that he is now
likely to be caught, at least eventually, and so he increases rather than decreases his criminal activity.
Alternatively, if finding a victim takes more time, we might think that the offender will spend less time
searching. But when a price goes up, we often balance the effect—we buy less, but pay more overall.
Here, the offender might aim to offend less, but spend more time searching, which might eventually
lead to him having even more time, perhaps because he loses his job or his existing relationships fall
apart. With more time on his hands, he not only spends more time searching, but so much more time
searching he winds up offending more often than he had prior to the implementation of the SOPR law.
For a discussion of Giffen goods generally, see NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE THEORY OF GIFFEN GOODS
(Wim Heijman & Pierre von Mouche eds., 2012). See also Uriel Spiegel, The Case of a “Giffen
Good”, 25 J. ECON. EDUC. 137, 137–39 (1994) (arguing that Giffen goods are more prevalent than
commonly recognized and providing various examples).
184
Deeanna M. Button et al., Using Electronic Monitoring to Supervise Sex Offenders: Legislative
Patterns and Implications for Community Corrections Officers, 20 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 414, 419,
425 (2009).
185
Id. at 427 (citing frugality).
186
See Brief for ACLU Michigan, supra note 133, at 18; cf. Alexes Harris et al., Drawing Blood
from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 115 AM. J. SOC.
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***
It can be no surprise that SOPR policies may sometimes fail to make a
particular offender less dangerous—or may even backfire from time to
time. The possibility that some number of offenders might become more
dangerous under SOPR laws, however, does not imply that most will. And
even if most sex offenders do become more dangerous under these laws,
they may become only a shade more dangerous, while a minority might
become significantly less dangerous—a scenario that would still produce
less recidivist crime. To better understand the conditions that will produce
higher recidivism rates, it is helpful to get a handle on how large the group
of offenders who become more dangerous is likely to be.
Consider the following three categories of sex offenders (defined in
Figure 1 below).188 The first group is actually a combination of two
subgroups (A & D) of sex offenders whose criminal behavior is unaffected
by the implementation of a SOPR law, even if they “feel” the effects of the
law.189 The application of a particular law to a particular set of registered
offenders may not matter to recidivism levels at all, either because these
offenders would have returned to crime regardless (group A) or because
they would never have committed another crime (group D), even absent
the law. Yet we pay, either way: society sacrifices for what are typically
considered fairly expensive laws,190 and offenders and their families suffer
1753, 1787–88 (2010) (observing that fees result in continued entanglement in the criminal justice
system); Leah A. Plunkett, Captive Markets, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 78–79, 85 (2013) (noting
enforcement efforts to collect unpaid fees and the difficulty of finding employment once non-payment
is reported to credit bureaus). See generally ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 1–2 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4CV-B9DG].
187
See Eric Markowitz, Chain Gang 2.0: If You Can’t Afford This GPS Ankle Bracelet, You Get
Thrown in Jail, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/chain-gang-20-if-youcant-afford-gps-ankle-bracelet-you-get-thrown-jail-2065283 [https://perma.cc/NXP9-UTBF] (detailing
the story of an offender for whom the cost of an electronic monitor had “sent him into debt and nearly
wrecked his life”).
188
To simplify matters, I assume that an offender either returns to crime or does not, and that the
level of harm created by returning to crime is identical across individuals. This assumption is not
necessary to make these points, but it keeps the discussion more intuitive.
189
In other words, the behavior of some sex offenders may be “inelastic” with respect to changes
in the parameters of the economic model of criminal behavior—i.e., their behavior may not change (or
may change very little) regardless of any changes in the “prices” they must pay for their choices. In this
context, because the “price” is not a transfer, the more inelastic offenders are with respect to SOPR
laws, the less attractive these laws are, all else equal.
190
See, e.g., Sam Wood, N.J. Study Scrutinizes Megan’s Law Effect, PHILLY.COM (May 6, 2007),
http://articles.philly.com/2007-05-06/news/25229023_1_new-jersey-s-megan-s-law-community-notific
ation-laws-megan-kanka [https://perma.cc/V8ZP-22PL] (noting that the implementation of Megan’s
Law, including notification and tracking provisions, costs the state millions of dollars); What Will It
Cost States to Comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act?, JUST. POL’Y INST.
(Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_fac_sornacosts_jj.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/MN7G-23BA] (finding that SORNA laws were projected to cost, to cite a few examples, nearly

1074

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1035

the negative consequences of these laws (lower uj) regardless of whether
offenders change their behavior. Although policymakers may purport not
to care about the latter issue, the former category of social waste must
matter to all, as the time, effort, and money could be better spent on other
crime reduction policies—or education, tax relief, what have you.191

Figure 1:
Potential SOPR Law Consequences
SOPR Laws
Would
Recidivate

Would Not
Recidivate

Would
Recidivate

A:
Unaffected, but
Burdened

B:
Burdened, but
Successful

Would Not
Recidivate

C:
Burdened AND
Counterproductive

D:
Unaffected, but
Burdened

No
SOPR
Laws

Second, a SOPR law may work as intended, causing some set of
offenders who would have committed further crimes to forgo doing so
(group B). The public and policymakers, infused with the optimism that
comes with “doing something,” focus perhaps too much on this group of
offenders.192 Finally, enforcing SOPR laws against registered sex offenders
has the potential to cause some offenders to choose to return to crime even
though, in the counterfactual “no SOPR law” scenario, these individuals
would never have recidivated (group C). This latter group of offenders is
$60 million to implement in California, around $5.6 million in Connecticut, and $14 million in New
Jersey in 2009).
191
Presumably, if we could identify these “inelastic” sex offenders, we would optimally choose
not to apply SOPR laws to those who will not commit new crimes and go with a more aggressive
approach—perhaps civil commitment—for those who will return to crime regardless of these laws.
192
Even if we assume that this set of offenders is sizable, we must still consider whether these
costly laws are worth the candle. The question is not whether the laws work at all, but whether they
work better than equally costly alternative approaches at improving public safety. Cf. J.J. Prescott, The
Challenges of Calculating the Benefits of Providing Access to Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
303, 307–10 (2010) (reiterating and elaborating on the claim that optimal allocation decisions weigh
“all relevant costs and benefits of funding all possible public enterprises”).
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both extremely important to the analysis of this Article and often simply
ignored because it is basically negligible when considering the likely
consequences of reforming traditional criminal laws.193 Figure 1 above
organizes the three categories of offenders.194
In what follows, I largely ignore the unaffected groups (A & D) for
two reasons. First, the debate over SOPR laws has primarily to do with
their effects on recidivism, and by assumption, the criminal behavior of the
members of these groups is fixed as regards SOPR laws. Second, to the
extent these groups do matter to how we might reform these laws, they
matter because members may shift back and forth between A and B or
between D and C, and thus B and C will grow or shrink in response.
Policymakers should not ignore groups A and D, however. The members
of these groups suffer the collateral damage of SOPR laws.195 SOPR laws
are irrelevant to whether these individuals recidivate, but still cause them
to suffer unnecessarily at taxpayer expense. If a large percentage of
convicted sex offenders fell into the “unaffected” categories, we would do
well to consider policies that were not only more effective, but more
efficient, and spread the social burden more equally.
The relative sizes of groups B and C determine the overall effect of a
SOPR law on recidivism levels. How they compare to each other will
differ depending on the specifics of the SOPR law, on the type of crime at
issue, and on the distribution of the “preferences” or beliefs and behavioral
tendencies of the sex offender population.196 Namely, the arguments above
regarding the likely behavioral consequences—and in particular, how the
laws might go wrong—determine the relative size of these groups.
193
The exception here being a Giffen-type situation, at least in my simplified framework. See
supra note 183.
194
The figure makes salient that, in all cases, these SOPR laws burden those who are subjected to
them. To the extent we include these costs in our calculations (which requires setting them against
public safety concerns), it is conceivable that even laws that target only individuals who fall into group
B—i.e., those who choose not to reoffend because of the enforcement of a SOPR law—would still be
welfare-reducing.
195
See, e.g., Richard Tewksbury & Elizabeth Ehrhardt Mustaine, Where Registered Sex Offenders
Live: Community Characteristics and Proximity to Possible Victims, 3 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 86, 88
(2008) (listing the many collateral consequences that registered sex offenders suffer on account of the
enactment, implementation, and enforcement of SOPR laws).
196
SOPR laws were, in part, driven by panic over “stranger danger” and the fear of child
molesters. E.g., Karen J. Terry, Sex Offender Laws in the United States: Smart Policy or
Disproportionate Sanctions?, 39 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 113, 113 (2015). These laws
often apply to all sex offenders, regardless of whether a particular SOPR law really makes sense for a
specific offender in light of his history and other characteristics. In the end, though, the relative size of
group B turns on the effectiveness of these laws, and unfortunately, conducting reliable social science
research in this area is challenging. See Kristen Zgoba et al., An Analysis of the Effectiveness of
Community Notification and Registration: Do the Best Intentions Predict the Best Practices?, 27 JUST.
Q. 667, 669 (2010) (“Measuring the effectiveness of policy variables on crime reduction, however, can
be complicated and often confounded by other variables that are strongly correlated to measures of
recidivism . . . .”).
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When we believe that the effects of a SOPR law on the traditional
parameters are quite small, and that a large part of the sex offender
population will not be responsive to these small changes in the probability
of detection and conviction (pj) and the physical difficulty of carrying out
the crime (cj), and we believe that the SOPR law significantly reduces the
value of the portmanteau parameter, and that its value is important to the
offender’s behavior, then the relative size of group B will be small. Higher
recidivism rates are more likely. When we believe the opposite, the relative
size of group C will be small, and we can worry less about sex offender
recidivism increasing in response to the enforcement of the law.
The portmanteau parameter is important to careful policy analysis
because it forces policymakers to explicitly acknowledge that SOPR laws
will only be attractive options under certain conditions, and that they may
be counterproductive under others. SOPR laws should not be reflexively
applied, but should instead be targeted at those situations where we believe
that reducing recidivism is the more likely outcome. These general points
are anything but new, but the approach laid out here facilitates precise
thinking about how to proceed going forward by identifying the key
considerations necessary to make the right trade-offs. For instance, as
currently deployed, GPS monitoring may be superior to community
notification because, even if the two policies affect the portmanteau
parameter in similar ways,197 monitoring seems likely to increase the
probability of apprehension (pj) and thus reduce recidivism by more than
notification is likely to do through its watered-down ability to increase the
pj and cj parameters.198 If it turns out that this characterization is true for all
or almost all released sex offenders, perhaps we should retire notification
and turn more heavily to GPS monitoring.
Absolutely essential is recognizing that reforming a law can alter the
size of each of the offender groups in Figure 1. One important and perhaps
counterintuitive scenario is that by reducing how burdensome these laws
are for offenders (increasing uj), policymakers may be able to shrink the
number of incorrigibles—offenders who recidivate under SOPR laws—by
making these laws easier to bear. The model makes explicit that we have
more tools for reducing recidivism than just the typical instruments of
crime control—pj, fj, and even cj. Depending on the population’s
preferences, using the portmanteau variable as the primary channel to
influence behavior may be the most effective and least costly choice.
Ignoring the portmanteau variable not only eliminates it as an affirmative
197

See supra notes 128–42 and accompanying discussion.
See Brian K. Payne & Matthew DeMichele, Sex Offender Policies: Considering Unanticipated
Consequences of GPS Sex Offender Monitoring, 16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 177, 179 (2011)
(describing the benefits GPS monitoring has over alternative sanctions, including incarceration and
community notification).
198
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tool, but raises the possibility that a SOPR law will increase recidivism by
“accidentally” reducing uj.
V. CONCLUSION
For years, reentry advocates have recognized that reducing recidivism
turns significantly on an offender’s reintegration into society.199 Offering
housing support, facilitating employment and training, and providing
counseling and opportunities for social integration and guidance are all
standard tools.200 The design of criminal laws, including SOPR laws, has
typically ignored these tools as a way to reduce crime. The traditional
parameters—increasing the likelihood of detection and conviction, making
punishment more severe, and increasing the difficulty of carrying out a
crime—almost always have the policy (and research) spotlight. There are
exceptions, however.201 And, over the last few years, a number of large
cities have begun employing strategies that use what appear to be “reentry”
tools as a way to reduce crime (particularly gun violence) in the first
instance.202 In particular, rather than threatening potential offenders with
punishment, law enforcement and other community groups offer these “at
risk” individuals social services, guidance, assistance, and trust—a way
out.203 Implicitly, these strategies recognize the value of the portmanteau
parameter in criminal behavior.
It may be too much in today’s political climate to expect policymakers
to reduce sex offender recidivism by passing laws that affirmatively help
offenders rebuild their lives. Or, to the extent they offer some services,
doubling down on those investments. But policymakers ignore the
portmanteau at their peril. SOPR laws should, at a minimum, minimize the
unnecessary suffering of sex offenders. We should not do this because sex
offenders “deserve” better treatment (although this may be true, also), but
199

E.g., James M. Cole, The Justice Department and Reentry Policy: Building Engagement,
Improving Outcomes, JUDGE’S J., Fall 2012, at 19, 20.
200
Id. at 21.
201
Cf. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE MANHATTAN COURT EMPLOYMENT PROJECT: FINAL REPORT
NOV. 1967–DEC. 1970 (1970), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/the-manhat
tan-court-employment-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4C9-CWHR]. It is notable that the Manhattan
Court Employment Project and other historical initiatives were designed to reduce the collateral
consequences commonly associated with criminal convictions by providing social services, counseling,
and employment to individuals charged with certain non-violent offenses in lieu of prosecuting them.
202
E.g., Emily Lane, BRAVE Using Unique Approach in an Attempt to Reduce Crime in Baton
Rouge, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.nola.com/crime/baton-rouge/index.ssf/
2013/12/brave_using_unique_approach_in.html [https://perma.cc/G6VQ-RQ96] (“BRAVE gives the
most violent offenders a way out. The program does this by offering free educational, addiction,
employment or faith-based services.”).
203
E.g., ANDREW M. FOX ET AL., MEASURING THE IMPACT OF KANSAS CITY’S NO VIOLENCE
ALLIANCE 8 (2015), http://cas.umkc.edu/cjc/pdfs/NoVA-impact-report-Aug2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DJ5Q-VBK9].
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because imposing disabilities and restraints on sex offenders may not be
different in kind from reducing monitoring and punishment levels.
Suffering usually leads to more crime on average, all else being equal, and
unless the suffering is productive on some other dimension, we ought to
abandon it solely on public safety grounds.
There is another implication of this logic. Despite the apparent
consensus to the contrary, at least with respect to notification and residency
restrictions, even if one or more SOPR laws do work to reduce recidivism,
they would work better if they also gave sex offenders something to lose if
they reoffended.204 If it is politically unrealistic to design uj-increasing
SOPR regulations, policymakers should try to identify and remedy
situations in which SOPR laws lead to avoidable hardship. For instance,
large numbers of sex offenders are homeless, and homelessness under
these laws does not lead to a reduction in an offender’s affirmative
obligations, but rather to an increase.205 While there are good reasons to
keep especially close track of transient sex offenders,206 there are even
better reasons to devote considerable energy to reducing or eliminating sex
offender homelessness.
Finally, as technology increases our ability to incapacitate individuals
outside of prison, the role of the portmanteau parameter in criminal
behavior will become ever more important to thinking carefully about
criminal justice policy. The ability to monitor and control will usually push
the “traditional” economic model of crime parameters in the right
direction, but will also almost invariably push the portmanteau variable in
the wrong direction. When imprisonment dominates our system for
controlling criminal activity, the portmanteau variable is much less
important. As the face of incapacitation continues to change, however, it
must become a habit for us to think about Becker’s portmanteau, and how
to craft and contour how we incapacitate so we move the ball forward on
all dimensions—or at least not backward.

204
Admittedly, this argument does suggest another option: simply increasing the severity of any
prison sentence, either the length of sentence or the harshness of the conditions. See supra note 136.
This option is more socially costly than simply augmenting the quality of life outside of prison, and it is
also likely to place a heavier financial burden on the criminal justice system, eliminating one of the
chief benefits of SOPR laws.
205
See supra notes 76, 113 (discussing the additional reporting obligations that apply to homeless
offenders); see also Levenson et al., supra note 125 (describing the positive correlation between sex
offender residence restrictions and homelessness among sex offenders in Florida).
206
See id. at 322 (reporting that sex offender transience is associated with recidivism and
absconding).

